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A STRACT 
The India - Pakistan dispute over the state of Jammu 
and Kas hmir ha s b ee n befor e t he Security Council of t h e 
United Nations in ter mitt .ently for s ome ten yea rs . In al l 
the attempt s at set tl ement th e only accomplishment of this 
body has b ee n to effect a cea se -f ire a gr ee ment betwee n the 
two dis putant s. The wr ite r' s objective in thi s paper is to 
investigate American po lic y in the dispute befor e the Uni ted 
Natio ns in a n e ffor t to discover the official p ositio n 
taken by t he United State s overnment . 
In makin g s study of this type i t was ne cessar y f or 
t he writer to investi gate the pr ima r y records of the Unit d 
Nations General Assembly and the Se curity Council . Gr ea te r 
emphasis was placed upon th verbatim recor ds of t h e 
Security Council , for it was in this or gan that American 
poli cy ias most evident . The mai n body of the thesis ha s 
been de veloped from these records . Other p r imary records 
exa mined were the State Deoartment Bulletins whi ch ex pressed 
broa d Amer i ca n policy in re gard t o South Asia and its effect 
on th K~s hmi r i s sue . The New~ Ti mes pr oved a n in -
valua b le source of in for mation for state ments and actions 
taken by the United States a nd the Se curity Coun c il which 
were not ye t pub l ished in the offi cial r eco rds of the U. N. 
The wr it e r was ab l e to obtain valuable pri mary and s condary 
iii 
material from the e'mbassies of India and Pakistan in 
ashington, _D. C. These were examined in order to ascertain 
the official poli cy of the two disputants . Se condary source 
material was found in the reports and bulletins of the 
Foreign Policy Associa ti on and various books . These 1ere 
examined for interpretation and application of fa cts 
obtained from the primary sources . 
The results of the study see m to indicate that the 
United tates continually urged th two parties to use 
peaceful means of settle ment and to abstain fro m ani u se of 
fore . This was a po lic y consistent with Chapter I, 
Artic le 2, Se ction .3, of the United Nations Charter . 
Se cond, 1'/a s hin .Fton placed gre at emphasis upon a 
plebisoi te in Kash mir under United .1.fations a.uspi ces . The 
plebiscite alone would determine the final accession of the 
state to either India or Pakistan . This principle of self -
deter mination has bee n a traditional po lic y of t he United 
States . 
Third, t he United States denied the validity of the 
ori ginal accession instrument si gned by t he Maharaja of 
ashmir and t he Indian gove r nment . Furthermor, the State 
Depa rtm ent viewed Ind ian control over Kash mi r as temporary . 
Fourth, the Uni ted States refu se d to condemn Pakistan 
as an a gg ressor in fashmir . This was a char ge that India 
had sou ght fr om the Securit y Council since t he introduction 
of the dispute in 1948. 
Fifth, a sl1in g ton sponsored jointly w1 th ot he r Council 
iv 
members nine r solutions seekin g to brin g the parties 
to a s e ttlemen t _ • . Both disputants for various reasons 
were unable to accept the recommendations .and sug gestion s 
made in the resolutions . 
Sixth ., the U'nited States has maintained that 
military a.id to Pakistan has not ehan g d the Kas hmir issue , 
nor altered the facts of t he deadlock . tater military 
paets , such as the SEATO and .&a .::dad treati s between th e 
United States and Pakistan , are consistent with t he Charter 
of' the United Nations . 
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OH.AFTER I 
I 11TRODUCTION 
On Augu st 15, 1947, Great Britain withdrew from the 
sub-co ntinent of India. rit1sh India was to be partitioned 
into two major states - India and Pakistan - with the future 
of some 565 princely states to be deter mined by the rulers 
of the states themselves. 1 With reference to the consti tut ional 
consequences of partition for the Indian p•ri n cely stat ·es, 
the Indian Independence Act of Ju ly 18, 1947 stated: 
As from the ap pointed day {Augu st 15, 1947} ••• 
the s u zerainty of Hls Majest y cve1· t h e I ndi an 
t at es lapses, and with it, all t1:"eaties and 
agree ments i n f0rce at t h e da te of t h e passing 
of t h is Act .. • • all obli ations of His · .ajeat y . 
existin g at t hat date towards Indian States or 
the Rulers thereof, and all powers, ri gh t~; 
aut horit y or jurisdiction exercisable by His 
Majesty at t ha~ date i n or in relation to 
Indian States . 
From a strictly le gal point of v:iew, both ' .· ndu and 
1oslem political leaders ag re ed that th is provision granted 
full freedom of action to the princely s tate s, i.e., to acc ed e 
to either India or Pakistan or to r emain as independe nt 
states. The general ass umption was t hat t he Moslem states 
1Mich.ael Brecher, Stru ggle fqr Kashmir (New York: 
Oxford Un iversit y Press, · 1953), p. 19 . 
2 
.fill•, p. 19. Brecher has reproduced th is fro m t he 
Government of India's, White Paper - on Indian States (New 
Delhi, 1950), p. 153. 
would acced e to Pakistan and the indu states to India. Sinee 
Kas hmir had not joined wit h eit her domini on, it became .tech-
1 
ni cally an indepen dent sta te . wo other rulers, those of 
Juna gad h and tlyder abad also chose o join neit h er dominion, 
and t hei r subje cts would pay dearl y f or their r u lers' in- . 
decisio n . In September, 194-7, th e .oslem r uler of Juna oadh _ 
acceded to Pakistan, but t he I ndia n army en tered the state 
and assured t h e 700,000 Hindus t hat 1 t would protect t he1.r 
ri gh ts a~d future. They voted for In dia. Similar eve nt s 
occurred when the Mosle m ruler of Hyderabad tried to post-
pone ind efin itely an y decision concer nin g the fut ure status 
of his predo minently Hindu state, and in September, 1948, 
t he country be came a part of India. The fa .te of Kasb.mi1~ 
was not as si mple as that of' the previous two states. 
Reli gious ,strife between the two peoples of the sub-
continent was already ra gin g unchecked. Leaders of the 
Muslim Lea o-ue and the Hi ndu Congress hurled char ge s back 
and fort h . Riots rea -ch ed threatening proportions in several 
re gi ons, particularly in the Punjab, borderin g on Kashmir. 
Thous a nds of people were killed, mi llions driven fro m thei1• 
homes, an d count less villa ges were burned to t he ground. The 
lon g awaited da y of independence was heralded with death, 
destruction and an guish. 
The two newl y esta blishe d governments were unable to 
1Michael Bracher, StruT gle f or Kashmir ( New York: 
Oxford University Preas, 1 53, p. 20. . 
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cope with the situation. Displac d persona fleein g from 
Hindu to ·oslem territorie s and vice-versa reached a · 
staggering numbex-. After t hese massive population move-
ments were ove~, Hindu India still had 40,000,000 Musli _ms 
within its boisders, and Moslem :Pakistan was left with over 
12,000,000 El ndu.s . 
The reli gious frenzy thats ept the area ~ffected 
Kashmir as well as the ,other princely states. In the spring 
of 1947 the FJ1ndu Maharaja brut all y suppressed .a "no tax 
·· campaign'' whieh the Moslem population bad tried to carry 
on . . Follower-a of the Crescent f'rom the · Fun jab a ::ld other 
distri¢ts entered the country t0 aid their Muslim brother s. 
The Maba:r;>s.ja., fearin g his own position, sought and received 
assistance fro m· lkh and hindu estrem.iats from areas out• 
sid.e Ka.shmir. 1 
B.aharaja Ha.ri. Singh of Kashmir w-as repeatedly advised 
by Lord Mountbatten to ascertai n the will of his people and 
to join one of the dominions. He disre garded this advice. 
Pressure. within the state continued to mount as refu gees 
poured into the aPee. from t3:1e Punjab bringing .with them the 
tensions ~d fears o.f bloodshed and defii.th. Many Muslims 
of .Kashmir fell before the rifles of the .Maharaja 's troops. 
Meanwhile, in Pakistan the tribesmen called for a J~had or 
holy war to aven ge the death of' their reli gious brethren. 
Aroused by the at.rociti s committed by the ruler's troops, 
l Uchael Brech er, Strurgle for Ka.shm1r ( New York: 
Oxford Universit y Press, 1953 , p . 26. 
' . ' 
f ' 
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·the .Afr:1.di and M.a-hsud warriors ero -saed the :Kashmir fro.nti r 
and swept into the J helu:m river valley, completely 
1 cruehin g all opposition. . Unfo:t~tu .. ately, the invasion 
e.xoeed-ed its boun ds and ended i n t h e rapin €!, lootin g , and 
pilla g i ng ,of Hindus and Muslims alike~ . Accordin g to Rol:>ert 
Trumbull, Mew York Tim.e·s correspondent, the at1..,ocities 
' ~- ............... --- ; 
p~obably rettched t h eir peak at Bara mulla whe:Pe an estimated 
· 2 
3,000 .ashmiris wtn"e put to the sword by the raiders. 
On Oetober 26, 194-7,. the MahaP&ja of Ka~hmir informed 
the Indian gove .rnment at Delhi that he had decided to join 
th$ Ind!~n - Dominion and at the ~ame time he asked for 
.m:!.11 tary aid to halt t h e invasion of his state by t he 
tribesmen,. On the f<;>llowin g day India aecept d the accession . 
of t h Ja mmu an d KastJ.IDir state to their do.minion and sent 
Indian troops into Kashmir . 3 
Pakiet'1tn • s on l .y move her e was to invite Indian 
leaders to Lahore for a disc u ssion or the s itu ation. A 
conference was held on November 1 at wh ich bot h the 
Gove .rnors-General were present. 'J!h. y were unable to arr1 ve 
at any lastin g agree ments • .However, Ali Ji nnah, Governor .. 
General of Pakistan d-id _present e three ... point proposal 
involvin g a, aease-fir-e, withdrawal of all alien troops, 
1Lo:rd irdwood, India and Pakistan ( N w York: F, A. 
Prae g er, 1954J .. p. 22.S. 
2Nove :moez• l C-~ 1947, p. 14. 
3r....ord Birdwoo~l India and Pakista n (New York: F~ A. 
Prae ge r, 19 .54-), p. 22q.. 
l 
and a plebia¢1 te under j 'cint eontrol of India a.nd ·. Pakista n . 
Mountbatten r .ejeetea /in..-qah 's p roposals, and 
suggested ;hat the plebi sc ite be ad mini stered by the United 
Nations, but J'inns .<h d1aa g reeel wli. th this; maint ai nin g that 
the Governors- Gene ral ' ahoulq o:r-ganite it Jeintly . i1e ve rt h e-
less, bn Noveml➔er 16 tiaqu a t Ali Khan, , P.;r,ime ~l11i s,ter- of 
' Pakistan, a.ske -d tha -t the ni tedl Nations be Jt.ppro& ohed fo1 .. 
a s0ttle:ment . · of thE:t dispute . At , f1 r st the Indian go~ver r.wtent · 
merel y deei;r:>etit Uni ·terl Nations . obSEfl"VE[ ;J:'·$ to a.dvise them rs ... 
ga.rdi:t 1g a plebiscit e, but s. t ·ew wee ks Later Belb. i officially 
· ;rtrquest,ed thfil Um. ted l\ations to int ,ervene ln t:ne Ka i(h..m-ir-
n 
Ci 
oon:fliot . 
l . . 
· Josef Korb el, Da.n~er in Kashmir ( Pri n ceton, .New 
.Jersey: Prinee-ton Unive:rsity Presa, 1 -5li.}., P• Ba • . 
2 I bid. ~, P ~ 90 .• 
C PTER II 
Tl:TE 0, .I.' ILI IE 
A . D THE CE SE- FIR E AGREE fiENT 
The United Nations Inte~venes 
On January 1 , 1948,. t he Government of .India t1 .. ans - · 
mitted a letter to the President or the e curit y Council 
asking that body to i nte rvene in t he ashmir dispute between 
its country a nd Pakistan . Indi<;1 speci.fi cally requested that 
the Council ask the Government of Pakistan to prevent its 
nationals from participating or assistin g in t he invasion 
of Kashmir~ India further requested that Pakistan refuse 
to the invaders a.ccess to and use of her t rritory for any 
hostilities against Kashmir , and t hat Pakistan halt the 
:movement of supplies or other materials to the invaders •. 1 
At a meetin g of' the Security Council on Janu ar y 6 
t he Kas hmir issue was placed on the a genda , initiatin g a 
discussion which was to last inte rmittently for ten years a' 
The President of t he Council, • F'ernand van Lan g enhove of · 
Bel g ium .,, after aski ng for objections and finding none, eon-
ctluded th at tbe Council a greed to invite Pakistan and India 
1unit -ed lfations., Security Council,. Official Records ,· 
3:rd Yr •. , Sup~ le ment f or November 1948., Hereafter referred 
to as U., N.-, .i:i . , c •. , Off •' Re c _., 
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l 
to participate in the discussions. 
Notin g that both t h e Indian and Pakistani dele gates 
had sufficiently prepared t heir bri efs on the Kashmir 
issue, President van Langenhove scheduled a disc ussion on 
January 15 at Lake Success, New Yorlt . The first to speak 
was Gopalaswami Ayy an gar of India, who restated the 
ori ginal request of his government and indicated to the 
Council that his gotre,rnment had 1'at ·no time put the ali ght -
e-st pressure G>n the state to accede to t h e Indian Dominion, 
beeause we realised that Yuishmir was in a vary diffi .eult 
position. "2 I:L." also declared t hat India was p:r•epa:rin g to 
/ 
negotiate e. standstill agreement wit h Kashmir , an ag ree ment 
which akistan h a.a already accepted in a tele o>ram t .o t he 
Kashmir g0ver:nment s·ome time ea.rlier.3 
The fir.at offic:ial policy by t he United States was 
given on t he sa me day by t he American re ·p:ra sentative , Warren 
Austin. He stat ed that t h e Kashmir issue was of u t most 
importance, but t hat "ne intemperate action should b e taken 
1u. N., s. c., Off. Rec .. , 3rd Yr., 226th Meetin g , 6 
Januar y 194.8, l'fo. 1-35, p. 5. 
2 lhid., 3rd Yr., 227th foetin g , 15 J'anuary 194-8, 
No. l•.3~ 13. 
3The iHaha.raja of Kashmir , Hari Sin gh ree.lised t h e 
necessity of reac hin g some understanding with the dominions 
of .India and Pakistan. lie notified both governments of his 
willin~ness to ne gotiate a Standstill A reeraent. On August 
15, 19~7, he signed su ch an agreement with Fakistan giving 
the latter complete operation of postal an d tele graph 
facilities. Pakistan was als o char g ed wit h the responsibilit y 
o.f supplyin g :t'ood and other nec ·essiti-es. Indi ·a neither 
accepted nor rejected t he Maharaja's requ est. 
by the Security Coun cil either in point of ti me or i n :point 
of substance .. "1 Washin gton felt t ha t all sides of t h e 
qu.estio n shoul d be t hor ou ghly aired befor$ the Council acted 
on any resolutions i n re gard to the issue .. 
On Jan uar y 16, 1948, the Pakistan case was presented 
by Sir Moha mmed Z.,_frulla han, who ar gu ed that t o s lems in 
Kashmir were bein g murder-ed and butchered by t he :Maharaja•s 
troops, , and that Pakistan could not stand idly by while t hese 
killin gs were takin g place . He proclai med t hat his govern ... ,
ment was astoni §he d to lear n that Kas hmir was seekin g 
"assistance" fro m an outside power. 2 Contin uin g his dis-
cu ssio n on t he followin g day ,, Khan suggested t hat t he 
tribes men wit hdraw fro m Kashmir, and at t he sa me time have 
t he Indian troops re moved to areas out si de the state. His 
further recommendations were to establish a cease-fire, 
and then th e Governors-General of Pakistan ~nd lndia 
would be g iven complete and full power to restor e t he peace. 
Followin g this action, Khan wanted the Governors - General 
to undertake full administration of the Ja mmu and Kashmir 
s,tate and arr.a n.ge a plebiscite without delay.3 
2 ;rbi ,fi., 3r Yr. , 228th eet in g ,, 16 January 194.8, 
No. 1-3 5, p. 77,. 
3Ibid., .3rd Yr.,, 2 29th Meeti ng ; 17 January 1948, 
No. 1-35;µ"7 89. 
-9-
Informal Discu s ions on Ka.shmir 
L 
After he ari.n g the case a s pl"esented by the Indian 
and Fakis-c . i representa t ives, the United Kin gdom recommended 
several possible m.e•th od ,s of solu t ion. First , the Council 
would call up on ·he govermBente o f both countriea to refrain 
from .issuin g any state ment s that would aga ra,rate the situation, 
and th en the two g overnmen s wou ld se ·ek sol ution by direct 
ne gotiations . Meanwhile, bo ·ch countries w uld inform the 
Council on any :matters tha t could possibly ch ang e the 
situation. 
Th e American delegation su ppor ed 'the p1 .. oposals 
made by t.h e rrli .,ed Kin gdom a nd emphatioally endorse d tih e 
reeo .mmendations t h at India and Pa ki stan try to reach an 
agree ment on t heir probl~m by direct negoti atio ns . 
Y1ashin gton advised that the Council r e oe1.1 for several da.ys 
in order ·c.o g :!.ve t h s parties sufficient time to on~ider the 
1 llla.tter. 
Anan gar of India and Khan of FakistQ n both welcomed 
t he Uiited Kin gdom propo.sals . Ths Indian dele gate :iig -
n ifieantly praised t h ese draft resolutio n s as ·iving India 
and Pakistan _an opp or tuni ty to arrive at a eoluti.on which 
. 2 
would be acceptable to both pa1 .. ties . · 
Thus negotiatloni ent.1>red t hat type of informal 
1u. N. ~ s. c., Off. Rec ., 3rd Yr., 22 9th Meetin g , 
. l.7 January 194-8, Mo. · 1.35, p. 126. 
2 Ibid., pp. 126-27. 
conversations which were desi gned, in the spirit of 
Ob.apter VI of the United ~at1ons harte~, to se ek settle-
r-Jent by direet atte mpts of t h e parties in d;1. pl~te ~ b.efore 
the Security Council would have to intervene arid :make 
re co:mmenda tions. 
A '.('hree • Man Commissi on on Kashmir 
On January 20, 1948, as a result of these informa l 
conversations, a re .solution .was passed in the Council 
establishinct a United Nations commia:aion to investiga te 
the facts and exereise mediatory influenee. Washin gto n 
supported this resolution, noting that both parties wanted 
the dispute settled by eaceful means and not by the 
intervention of an ar med force- The Ameri ca n position 
streBsed tbe point that a pleb iscite should be held un der 
t he supervision of the United :iati ons. Thi s vrnuld ensure 
complete impartiality on the part of the plebiscite 
administrators and would permit the people of Ja:mmu and 
Kas.hmirto exereise their vote in a free and democratic 
manner . 1 
Unfortunately, the first three•rnan commission 
established by t he Council was not dispatched to t h e sub-
continent. The resolution which created the mediato ry 
body was a highly modest one. It made no menti on of t h e 
1u. 1.i:r., s . c., Off. Rec,., 3rd Yr., 237th !vesting, 
29 Januar y 1948, No. 1•35, p. 286. 
wi thdr-a11ra.l of e1 t he ,r the tri 'be·smen or the Indian army, nor 
did it incorporate th e American demand for a plebiscite . 
The <:1otlmiiss.f on f~iled to &ccom:plish an y la .sting agreements 
between the two disputants . 
Indi~n Policy in ~asb:mir 
The Indian pesit1on from the very beginning was that 
India was in fact and in law the le gal soverei gn of the 
hi~ pr•inc:elf state to t.h e Indian Uni on .. fe.lti.stan:t mili ta.ry 
fore -es had invad d Indian te:i:•i·•l to-:::\, by going into Kashmir 
s.nrl the Council, aecordh1 g to New Delhi, must condemn 
Pakistan as an aggPessor .. No po~s1ble s-ettlement would be 
eons.id~rfHl by India until the ilakistani civilians (tribesmen} 
and mi lltary -personnel were withdrawn from the stat -e.., The 
I ndian- gover nment would not eo n.side?°' any pleb.isei te un.til 
these forces wave withdrawn,. 
We.~hin gton •s View That Indian Control 
over :Kashmir Was Temporary-
India n eontrol over Kashmir was only temporary as 
seen by Warren Austin, American deleg ate , to the Secu:rd ty: 
Council, A plehi$cite was naoese e.ry before t he temporary 
eha.1 ... acter of the control could become , permanent . l Th e 
United Stat. es pr,cibably based 1-ts polio3' ' on th e · state me nts 
is -sued by officials of the Indian government -. Nehru, 
speaking before the Constituent Assembly in New J;lelhi 
on November 25, 194.7, declared ; 
We did not want a m~re accession from the 
top but an association in accordanae with the 
will of her people. We have gone to Kashmir 
to pl"oteet the people and a.s soo n as this duty 
1s dischar ged our forces need not re main there 
and w-e shall withdraw them.l 
The Pri me Minister of India cl -ar1fied hi s views in other 
statements saying that until Kashmir was 9ompletely free 
of invaders, no possible plans could be made for holding 
a. pleblsci te -. 2 
The United States Proposes 
Second Commission ror Indian-Pak1 -stan Dispute 
On April 21 the United States spo nsor ed jointly with 
the United Kin gdom, Bel gium, Canada, Ch ina, and Colombia 
a :resolution that would establish a seeond United :tfations 
commission for India and Pakistan. The terms of the re-
-solution were, briefly, that a five-man com.mission would be 
set up to go directly to the sub-continent and offer its 
good o.ffices and mediation efforts to the two parties. 
Pakistan was asked to withdraw all its nationals not normally 
residents ef the state and when this was accomplis h ed India 
1 India, Information Service, K-a.sbmir A Faetue.l 
Survey (New Delhi; Deee mbe·t>, 1956), pp. 73 ... +6. 
2 India, Information Serviee, Kas hi~ir l 
Excerpts from Prime , Minister N~hru .' s Speec h es 
United Press, Old Secretariat, 1956, p. 11. 
would re move all 1-ts tro ops . Th e In "is n government was to 
be rea pons'l ble fen .. r e cr ui t in g local pe op le to :mai ntain pea ce 
an d or der . 1 
Austi n , speakin g to the Council just before t t.e fin al · 
adoption of the r -e·solut1on,. insisted that all poll ti cal 
parties should be fairl y represe nt d within t h e government 
o f the stat.e, and t h is p:Pincdple was late r ineluded in the 
resolution . He also · added that his government was plea sed 
to see that both Pakistan a:no IncHa had a.g reed to settle 
their dispute tb:rou _gh peaceful means . The Ameri ean dele ate 
· placed special emphasis on the ri ght of t he people to d~eide 
their future by a plebis c ite • . Austi n olosed hit1 remarks 
by noti , t hat r·esponsible Indian leaders ha d proclaime d the 
desire and willin gness to see the dispute sobr ·ed by a 
plebis ci t e under interna t ional auspioes. 2 
The United Stat es served as a member of the second 
Unit ed Nations Commission .for India s.nd Pakist .an ( UNGIP). 
Austi n aecept e d th e appointment of his oou.."lt ry on May 7, 1948, 
a.:rid representin g the United St ates was J. Klahr h3uddle.. '!'h e 
i\111erioan dele gation eonaisted of a military and political 
advi se r as well as a secN,tarial staff . 3 
lu. N., s. c., Off . Rec . , 3rd Yr., Supplement for 
April, • 1948. 
Zi·oid ' 
.3rd "'~ 284,th Meetin g ,, . 21 Apri1. 1948, ~-, ...r ., 
p .. 20. 
3 3r d Yr,,, 289th Meetin g , 7 Viay 1948, 5 .. Ibid., P, __,.,,.,,.__ 
had priority on the agenda of the Security Council , Austin 
observed that both p~rties retained armed forces in Kashmir , 
re gardless of their peaceful intentions of solution . He 
later .added that possibly India and Pa}dstan did not want 
. 1 
to settle their differences over Kashmir . 
The resolution of April 21 was in substance not 
a greeable to either India or Pakistan. In a letter to the 
President of the Security Council, Zafru l la Khan of Pakistan 
expr ssed the follo •in g view: "Measures indicated in the 
resolution are not adequate to insure a free and impartial 
plebiscite; ana the government of Pakistan cannot carry out 
obligations s~mght to be laid upon them by the resolution . "2 
Mr. P. P . Pillai, the representativ · of India wrote the 
Security Council that his government could not implement 
those parts of the r .eaolution concernin g the plebiscite 
administrator . 3 
American. Dele i:,-ate Comments on Powers of 
UNCIP and Interpretation of Pacific Settlement 
The Am rican representative, arren ust1n, supporte ,d 
the idea of widening the powers of the eommission . Re ad -
vocated t hat it report to the Council on the Pakistan char ges 
a gainst India in the Juna adh and genocide cases . New Delhi 
1u. N. , s . c. , Of'f . Rec . , , 3rd Yr . , J04th etin, 26 
ay 1948, pp . 20 - 21. 
2 Ib1d . , 3rd Yr . , Supple ment for May · 1948, p .. 91 . 
3Ibid . , p •. 92 . 
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did not war.it t h e UNCI P t o investi gate these char ges. 1 
:fevertheless, . Austin su gg ested that the commission in-
vesti gate and sub mit its results to the Council, and then 
t he Council would instruct u,e mediator y- body as to 1 ts 
2 later objectives. . This was considered a pro - Pakistani 
move on the part of the United States si nce it coi cided 
with the proposals of the Pakistani delegatien •. India 
strongly asserted that th.is was not an international 
pro ·ble:m and the Junagadh a nd . genocide claims o.f ·Pakistan 
were strictly a domestic matter to India alone. , The United 
States wanted all these mat ters r e ferred to the U JGIP, . 
but with the understandin g that the Kas hmir issue had first 
priority and the other mat ters would be taken up at the 
discretion of the Council. 
At t he 304th meetin g of the Security Council, Austin 
:requested the Council to interpret the Charter ef the United 
Nations. ; Specifically, he wished to know what the obli gations 
were upon parties in a dispute under the "pacific settle ment1t 
pro -visions ·of the Charter. Per haps, he conti nued, they 
might be de termined and applied to this dispute or at least 
1Pakistan char ged India with a gg ression resulting 
from. India's invasion of the State of Junagadh. The ruler, 
a i:'ioslem h ad acceded his state to Pakista n . Indian troops 
entered t h e sta te, depo sed t h e ruler, and held a plebi sci te. 
The Hindu majority voted for India. Karac h i also char ged 
India with g enocide of . the f-oslem n1a j ori ty i n Kapurth ala 
as a result of t h e eommunal upheava l. Pa kistan clai med 
235,000 Musli ms were 1m1ssacred .· 
2 tr. M., s . C. ~4off. Rec. ·, 3rd Yr., 312th Meetin g , 3 June 194.B, _p . 36-';I , p. 6. _ 
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established as a pr ece dent for future pQrties to d5.sputes. 1 
P';i-s query went unanswered. 
The commission did not arriv@ on the sub-continent 
until t he _second week of July, 1948, some six months ~fter 
the parties had given Q thorough account of the situation 
to the Se.cur:t ty Goun cil, and some thr ee months after tbe 
Council had passed a resolution creating a feeble attemp t 
at solution* When- the eo:mmission arrived; the fighting had 
been renewed with inte~ s e vigor; thousands of civilians 
as well as soldiers -· ere being k ille d in the conflict,, Never-
theless., in the Security Council on August JO., 1948, Austin 
declared that no emergency existed in .Kashmir . The United 
States a t this time .strenuously objected to ha~ing the 
Kash mir issue inc l uded on the provisional ·agenda of that 
body; its position was that th commission's objectives 
were elearly set forth in paragraph 17 of the resolution 
of April 21, and the ,commission had not &sked for assistance. 2 
Washin gton f'elt that t he commission could well handle all 
I 
negotiations and mediation that n eded to be accomplished 
in order to effect a ceas e -fire and solution i n the dispute .3 
1u. N., S. G., Off' . Rec • ., 3r-d Yr . , 356th eet ing , 30 
Augu .st 194,8 ., No. 9 5-1 08, p. j. 
2PaNtgraph 17, Resolution of April 21, 194.8, reads: 
"The Commisston should establish in Je.mmu and Kashntlr such 
ob.servers a s it may require of any of the proceeding s in 
pur s uance o.f the measures indicated in the for egoing para-
g raphs." . · 
3u. N., s. c., Off. Reo ., . ·3rd Yr ., 356th :eetin g, 
30 August 1948, No. 95-108, P• ~ . 
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Secretary of St at Geor g e c • . Marshall, a.peaking 
before '&he General Assembly le$s than a month :;tater, 
partially :revised his country's attitucle. He found the 
situation char ged with great dan g~rs that threatened world 
pea:ee, but ·he still voiced the opinion that, since both 
, parties mt,.intain ed their willin gneas to use pacific means 
in settlement., an immediate e:on·clusion : ·could be cleiu·•l y 
envisioned. 1 
By Januar y 1.949 the commfs·sien we.a able to bri~ g 
about a oea.se .-fire a g re ·ement 'between the p~rties .. F4rther 
a greements we;re made on truce is sues, demilitarization of 
.the stat .e, and .a plebiseite. The greatest stumbling 
block w&,s how and when to implement these agreem~nts.. There-
upon, the Ame:riean dele ga te, '.P.hi lip Jes$up 1 prai.sed both 
governments for thei:r states manlike action on this issue. 
He and his government, Jessup continued, looked forward to 
2 
an early set tlement~ The American dele gate ga .ve mueh of 
the credit r-o:r tb.e e~ase-flre to Pakista n and India, .sinee 
it was to their advantage, for neither eountry could afford 
to bear the cost of war at this oruc.ial ti me ., Littl e did 
1unit d Nations, General A-esembly, Official Reeords, 
3rd ession, Pa.rt One, 139th Plenar' y r, ·~etin g , 2:3 Septe mber 
194-8, p. 41.. .Hereaft er referred to a.a U. M~, G. A. , Off~ .Ree. 
2u. N., s .• O., Ofi\ . Ree .; Lith Yr_., 399th Maet:lng, 13 
J a nu ar y 1949, No • 3, P. 7. 
Jessup know that the basic issues on de mill t ar zation and 
plebiscit .€ propos a ls would neve r b e resolved; a.t least 
they have .not be en in the decade whi ch h s passed. 
American Polic y in th First Year 
of the Kashmir Deadlock 
In s m'Wlarim i ng American policy in th e first cr u ci 1 
year, the writer believes that aahi ngt on was partial to 
t ho Pa asta n1 ar gt.lment o n the 1-ssue .. It was not a mid dle . 
o f the !•oad cou.rs .e, nor wa.s it a '*do, no thin ~" po11 CY·• It 
did without questi on su ppo rt the id ·a th a t a final settle-
ment of the dispute would r est up on a vote of the Kasrunir is 
th amselv e ·• oth pa r-ties agreed to this p r ineipl a and it 
was n ot imposed up on them by any Secur ·i t y Council re-
aol uticm -. A.1t1erican policy further emph a s ize d that the 
ple bisc ite shou ld be he ld un der United 'ations a usp ices ., 
pref era b l y under a plebiscite administrator . 'l' as hingt on 
first encoura ged th e idea th at India and Pakistan ho ld 
infor•mal co nversation s on th eir problems. F1"'om inf or mal 
talks America n de le gates :recommended ·h~t a thr-es ... znan 
commission be created t o act as nediators. This first 
eommisaion was a oomplet-e failure. 'r'he United States t hen 
sponsored resolution e~teblishing a seeond commission, 
wi t h an enla r g ed members h ip and stron ger powers . 1'h is 
sec ond commissio n was able to accomplish four majo r agree• 
ment s: a cease-fire, truee, demilitarization, and a 
ple b iscite~ The cease - •fire was · i mpl emented in January 1914,9 
bu t the r omai nlng thr ee ha ve 'been in question for t he past 
ten years of t he deadlock. 
CE.APTER Ill 
India Suggests Arbitration on Agreed Issues 
Throu ghout 1949 the U iCIP Wl3.S -unable to bring about 
any substantial pro gress on the Kashmir issue. There was 
one note of hope during the year, however; it came with 
the appointment of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as United 
Nations Pleblsci te Administrator ' for Kashmir. ·The State 
Department made 1 t clear that he represented the United 
Nations as an international ·organizati on and not the United 
l States~ 
A significant cha nge in the method of solution 
occurred in the Indian position. Speakin g before the 
General Asse mbly, Sir tlenegal Rau declared that as far a i, 
Kashmir was Qonce:rned , Indi a. was not wholly oppo .sed to the 
idea of a.rbi tration on a greed issue s., but theae issues would 
have to be cle arly defined beforehand . He repeated that 
India continued to desire a peaceful and stable solution 
to the issue, 2 
1u.i s., Department of State, "Fleet Adm., Na.med as 
iie.s . .imir Ple biscite Admini8trator, rt Department of St ate Bulletin; 
ll (March, 1949), 419. Herearter referred to as u. s., · 
Depa rtment of State Bull e ti~ . 
2u. N~; G-. A., Off. Rec., 4th Session, 222nd Plenary 
Meeting , 21 September 'I91r9, p. 10. 
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In October 1949 the Paki st an government accepted 
arbitration of truce issue s as a means of pus hin g t e 
dispute toward an early settlement. The Indian gove r nment 
. refused arbitration, saying that · t he issues to be arbitrated 
l were toe ambi guous and not sufficiently defined . 
UNCIP Reports to the Security Council 
The idea of arbitration had been first su ggest ed 
by the commi ssio n on all differences of implem nting the 
truce a greement. Later in the year, Hernando Semper, 
Chairman of the u rcrP, informed the Council that the 
commission could de no more to bring about a settlement 
since it had been unable to get either party to implement 
the resolutions of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949.2 
In the August 13 resolution India and Pakistan 
agreed to the complete withdrawal of' all Pakistani troops 
from Kashmir as well as all non-Kashmiri nationals not 
normally residents of the state., . When Pakistan had completed 
this movement the commission would notify the Governme nt of 
Ind al~;.' . New Delhi would t hen withdraw its forces- from the 
state on sta ge s to be a greed upon with the -commission •. 
' India and Pakistan also consented to the principle of a 
plebiscite fo:r the people of Kashmir in determining their 
future . The two gover nments gave their full consent to 
1u. s., Department of State u.llet:1,n, nu. ·N. Action 
Reviewed," XXI ( October, 1949), 65'+ .. 
2u. N., s. c., Off. Rec., 4th Yr., 457th Meetin g , 
17 Deeember 1949, No. 53, p. 2. 
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the U:t{CIP resol ution of .ranuary 5, l 49, whic h r a i terated 
the plebiscite propos 1 as soon a the truce a g r ·eement a nd 
pleb soita arrangements had been comp leted. India and 
Ps.l;:ist~n gs,.,ra full approval to the appoint ment of G. UN 
plebiscite ad :.ninistrator. 1 
Th e United '' tates fou.n t £at t he commlssion rep ort 
· in eceimber 1949 sug ges'i;ed au equitable :lfvluticm to th e 
Kasrunir i;3sue. W~shington was eons1stent wit h its previous 
stand on Ke.shmir i~ taking the vie1,v that the future. o,f - the 
state would be determined by the fre~ly exp1' f'H;sed will of 
its people, The State Department noted that the plans for 
solution WsJ•e flexible enough to lend. themselves to 
modification by the two par·ties con-cer:ned. The American 
deputy representa t ive to the Couneil, Ern e st G1 ... oss, said 
these were not the only solution~; others undoubtedly 
2 
~xisted and could be arrived at by India and Pakistan . 
Washi n gton Suggests Appointment of a 
u. N. Repre .sentative to Replac ur;cr:P 
By 1950 the Unit d States seemed to show more interest 
in t h e issue, t'or it sponsored a resolution jointly with 
Cuba, .1fot-way, and tl e Uni ted Kingdom ,. Vlashington belisved 
1Jose:f Korbel, Danger in Kashnli~ (Princeton, N w 
Jersey: Prine ton Univer ity Press, 195L~), pp. 312-19. 
2u. N., .... c., Off. Rec., i~th Yr .; 458th eeting, 
29 December 1949, No. s[i:, P• 13. 
that the problem had to be solved alon g broad po l itica l 
gro unds . The plan ealled for both parties to a gree on a 
workable outline of demilitarization and then to carry it 
out as a prerequisi te to the final sta e of a plebiscite . 
Thi s pla n for .reducing t h forces called for a .minimum 
number to a point where they did not interfere with th e 
free exp ession of publi c opinion in the propesed 
. 1 plebiscite. 
Was hi n ::.,ton wanted this demilitarization problem 
accomplis h n o-b.h sides of the ceas .e• fi;re line; Indian 
troops must no t go i n to the northern or Pakistan -held areas 
of Kashmir . It heartily approved the UN plan to appoint 
a representatl ve· to supervi se the implementation and 
assist in the preparation of a program of demilitarizin g 
t he state . 2 This American sponsored plan for KashmiP was 
finally adopt don March 14-, 1950, embodying the above ideas 
and terminatin g the ijeeond UNOIP. 3 India , in a note to the 
Council , proposed a three - man UN team , one appoi nted by 
India, one by Pakistan , and one by t he President of the 
Securit y Oouncil . 4. akistan approved the resolution , but 
with reluetanoe . In April 1950 t h · ou.ncil eonsented to 
lu. li . , s. c. ~ Off . Ree. , $th Yr .,, q.67th ~eetin g , 
24 Febpuary 1950, No. 9, p . 15. 
2 17. Ibid ..,. p . 
- · 
3u. N. , G •. A ., . Off . Bee .; 5th Session ., Supplement 
l~O • 2 , p . 13 •. 
4u. N., s. c. , Off • . Re c • ., 5t h Yr .. , 469t h Pheeting , 
8 ~ rch 1950, No. 11 , p . 5. 
the appointment of .Sir Owen Dixon ae UN representative for 
India and Pakistan. 
Washington Notes Improv~ment in 
, Indian - Pakistan Relations . 
The State Depart ment at this time was quite pleased 
to l earn that t be Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India 
had met in New D~lhi to :rea ch accord on minority g roups 
in their countries . V/hen the two nations signed a tr•e~ty 
guaranteein g the pl'otection of minorities ; the United 
States saw the ope nin g of' & new era in better relations 
between India and Pakistan . 1 
Moting that this Prime .Ministers'meeting in India 
roight lead to further accord in Indian-Pakistan :r•elations, 
the United States did not want the Security Council to 
consider the question of blame or guilt in the Kashmi r 
di spute . What it did want was to increaiss the stren gth 
of the UN mediating represent&tive as far as it was proper 
tc, do so . ·"In s,ayin g this ?le cs.st no aspe1~si6ns t. whatsoever 
upon the par-ties,n Austin explained . 2 Their p1oblem was ex-
ceedin gly difficult, he continued , and the Couneil was not 
tr•yin g to enforce so methin g by punishment, coercion, or any-
t hing of that kind . 
. 
1u. s.,. De . 
Encoura ge d by Ind 
Austin also declared that the Coun cil 
of State Bulletin, "Department 
Talks, XXII April,. 1950 ), 631 .• 
2 u. N. , s . c., Of'f' . Rec. , 5th Yr., 471st Mee.ting, 
12 Ap:t'il . 195 0 , No. 13~ p. Io . 
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wa s atte mpting to u.se t he fi. n est of 1nstrument -a1i ties 
in ell dis p u tes, p elfie I!iettle ment ~_· 
Si r wen Dixon' a F'irst .~port 
to the Secur ity Coun cd 1 
Unfortunately; Dixon's medi ato ry efforts wer e un• 
availin g . In trans mi tti ng ni s report to the Council i n 
Septe mber 1950, . he info1"med the body t h at all his s ugg estions 
h a d f alle n on deaf a.rs~ , Bot h parties failed to _a g z•ae on 
any of the pre li mina 1•y measures ·of d m111 tarizatiori t h at 
iuet pr ecede the plebiscitei . India wanted P ki' $ten condemned 
as a n &g""ras sor ; a ch ar g;e t hat \4 as hington did not wi sh t he 
N r pt "esentati va to even eonside r .. Dix on informed th e 
I dia n offieial -hat b.e was instructed by the ,ouneil no t 
t o pass any stat ements on thi s subje ct . l n<lla late r cl a i med 
that Dixon did wake a i ' eble atte m t at eonde mnlng Pakistan 
as a n a gg ressor in Kash mir.. u ixon' s atit te mcnt ran to this 
eff et: 
Without goin g i nto t he ca u.ses or reasons why 
it hap pene d, which pr e umably form ed part of t h e 
history of the sub- contivi ent, I was Dr epared to 
adopt t h e view that when the fr •ontier• of' t.he 
State of Jammu and Kas b111ir was crossed~ on I 
be liev e 20 Oct ob er 191+7, by bcs t.ile ele ments :, 
it was contrar y to international lawl and th a t 
when, in May 1948, as I believe., units of the 
re gular> Pakistan force moved into t he territor y 
of the ◊tate, t hat too was inconsistent with 
inte :t>natio nal la w-.1 
1u,. N,. , S. G,. , Off ,., ~~ ·•,, 5th Yr ,., Supplem ent for 
Sept mber - Deoen.ber 1950., · };h 29 .• 
American Delegate presses Apprehension over 
Con$t 1t uent Asse mbl y in Kashmir 
In February 19.51 the Kashmir dispute ,ras once age.in 
pl a ced on -the agenda of the Secu:rity Council. The St~ te 
Depa r t ment ob s erved th a t bot h countries were still of ,t h e 
opinion that t he issue could bo settled pe~cefu ll y . Ernest 
Gross, the Ameri ca n del egate , wanted the Council to "hel p 
narro w t h e fie ld · of disa greement . '' He also expressed con-
cer n over the woztk of t h e authorit i es in t he Indi an eon .... 
trolled area of Kashmir, and t h eir p lan to d,etermine t h e 
fut u:re affili.a tlon of the stat e witho ut a plebiscite. The 
Indian gove r nment had given it s permission for th e convening 
of a eons ti tuent asse mbl y in. 1 t .s ar ea of the sta ,te., 
Was h ington he l d that, in s u ch n e v 0 nt In dia wou ld violate 
1 te ea.rlier a gr•e-e:ment~1 in the TJNCIP resolutions. In 
sp ea king to the Counci l, Gros s note d t hat: 
T e Uni t ed State ·s g ove1"'runent f i:rml y bel ie ves 
thQt t here can be no r ea l and lastin settle-
ment of the Kashmir disp ute which is not 
acceptable to both partie s~ Any atte mpt to 
decide t he issue wit hout t he cons en t of bot h 
parties would onl y leave a constant and ex.-
plosi ve irrits.nt in th r elations between 
these two gover nments, an irritant which would 
effeoti vely pr eve nt the bri ng ing a.bout of' 
peace a nd sec urity in 1outh Asia .I 
Was hington teok a fi r m ~tand tha ·t the Counci.1 sho u ld 
not ace pt or approve a ple bi scite cond u cted with out the 
lu '11.t ~ ff 6 r:: ... 
., lh" ,_,. c., 0 . • Rec., th Yr., ;,,3~nd Meeting, 
21 Februa~ y 1951, p . 112~ ......... ----
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latter's apprpval or witho ut a superv isor appo in ted by t he 
Council. . The very existe nce of a constit uen t assembly in 
Indian-held Kashmir, able to deter mi ne Kas hmir's future, 
would obviousl y not be 111 accordance wit h t he ter ms of a 
fajr a nd impartial pl b : sci te • . 1 
The Seco nd UN Representative 
In late February 1951 t h e Uni ted States pro posed 
. a joint dr a .ft res o lu t io n with the Unite d Kin gd om, aski ng 
the Security Council to re -a pp oi nt a U} representative to 
help the pa _rties e ffect a emilitarization of the state! 
The mediator would present possible de t ails n plans 
for ca,rr yin g out the plebis cl te a g r ea b le to both partie s . 
He would be given g reater powers., wit h stren gthened and 
amplified term s of r e ference. The demllitar1zation pro-
posals woul d be drafted by the mediator an d then presented 
to l ndia an d Pakistan . If at all possible, he wou ld attempt 
to make use of these two aids: a United r atio ns force durin g 
the de milita ri za t ion a n d plebiscite ~eriod, and an atte mpt 
to get both parties to accept arbitratio n upon points of 
difference left over after ne gotiations have bee n made and 
carried out by the UN represe ntative. 
Washi ng to n be lieved i t was the duty of the Security 
Council to eall to the attentio n of both I ndia and Pak istan 
their obli gations und er t he United l ations Charter to seek 
1u .. , s . c., Off. Rec., 6t h Yr., 532nd ~eetin 3 , 21 
February i9 51, p . 12. 
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a solution by all manner of pea cef ul means , in~ludin g 
arbitration . 1 · Alt hough India had su g eated this method 
of solution as early as Sep temb r 1949, it was now 
opposed to er i tra tion. Pakistan also r•ejected this 
. ashin · ton proposal sine it implied a reference to 
partition of (ashmir . ~arachi would never consent to a. 
plan involving partition . 2 
Ne Delhi Objects to the Reso l ution 
India tried to reassure the Uni ted St ates ana the 
othel" Council membez~s that the constituent assembly in 
Kashmir was not i ntended to prejudice t he prob l em as it 
existed before t he Counci l. The Indian representative 
maintai ned that his nation was a secular state with 
min orit y ri gh ts guaranteed to all re gar less of race or 
reli g ion . He . r.&i tera ted the principle that Kasb..mir was 
le gally and integPal ly a part of the Indian Union . By 
federal l aw, the state as permitted to draft or formulate 
its own const itutio n ., an d to convene a constituent assembly 
for the state. Indi~ , be decl red , could never permit the 
entry of foreign troops into the state, er in any other 
part of India . As for t h A _lo- American d ra ft resolution , 
tbe Indian government was wholly unable to accept it . 3 
1 N., s. C •, Off . R ~-, 6th r ., 532nd I\:'eetin g , • 
21 February 19 51, p . ls"" • . 
2 Ibid ., 6 t h Yr . , 534th . teeting , 6 /!arch 19Sl, P • 2 . 
3 L.!.9.., 6t Yr ., 533rd ,eetin g , l arc h 1951, p . 9. 
Nehru, at a press confereno$ some weeks later, .announced 
that India would nave!> a cc@pt arbitration on the di! ferences 
confronting India and Pakisten. He deelared that India 
could not upset nor violate its constftution because of 
some resolutions put forward in the Security Counoil . 1 
Due to the stre ·nu.ous ob.jeetions by IndiA and 
Pakista n, the United St ates £otind it ~ecessapy to tone 
down lt proposals to what Ernest Gross called "the 
irreducible machinery ." Since the two parties wanted the 
UN representative to utilize the · previous UNCIP resolutions, 
the Alnerican dele gation added the following amendments , to 
its latest proposals: 
{l) The UN Representative ou.1.d e:ff"eet 
demilitarization on the basis cf the 
UliCIP .resolutions of 13 August 1948 
and 5 January 1949. ' 
(2) If no agreement is made on demilitarization 
plan after a thl'ee :month period, then the 
UN mediator is t ·o report back to the 
Council. (3) The two parties should a~cept arbitration 
on those points reported to the Security 
Council by the U'tl Representative. The 
arbitrator would be appointed by the 
President ot the International Court 
of Justiee . c::: 
The State , Department re garde d the arbitration pro -
posal as the key to the resolution . It attempted to pro -
1India, Information Service , Kashmir 1 
Ex.cer ts from P1•ima ~ iniste:r- Nehru ts s . eec hes 
Unite d Press., Old Secretariat, 19 , p . 2 · • 
2 u. u., S. c., Off'. Rec., 6th Yr . , 537th Meeting , 
21 March l951, p . 9. 
/ 
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vide both parties with recom menda t ions nee ded in settlin g 
. t he dispute. Althou gh India and Pak ist an r eje c.ted it 
vi go rousl y , Was hin gto n would not agree to its re moval fro m 
t h e resolut ,io n . 
The t _wo di aputa nts were given th e opportunity to 
present their views on t he revised British -American dr aft 
resolution. The f irs t to apea :k to the Council was Sir 
Benegal Rau of India wh o again opposed t he i de a of 
arbitration on :m~jor differe nces . In dia , he de clar ed, 
coul d neve r submit a purely domes ti c matter to an intep .. 
national a rbi tral body~ 1 Bevera l days later t he Pa kistani 
rep resenta t iv e i nfor med t e Council th at t h e revised 
resolution was s.cee pt ab l e to his gover nment, including t he 
ite m on a rb itra.tio n . 2 Disre gardin t he Indian ,objections., 
the Council a dop te d the r es olutio n by ei ht votes i n favor 
with tbree abstentions . 
Se lecteQ to serve as t he new United Natio ns 
pepresentative f or India and Pak ist an was Dr , Fra nk P . 
Gra ham, who was ap poin te d on April .30, 1951,., This ti me 
t he .mediation eff orts were to be turned over to a noted 
America n ed,u cator and former p resi dent of t he Unive r s i t y of 
Nort h caroli na . His eff orts on the s ub - continen t were 
frustratin g fo r al.l thre e partie s since no a greement coul d 
1u. N., S . c. , Off' . Rec . , 6th Yr . , 538th Meetin g , 
29 arc h 1951, No . 538, p . 7. 
2 Ib1 d . , 6th Yr . , 540 t h Meet ing , 2 April 1951, -1Jo. 540, p . q::-
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b e reac h ed on h .. pl e mentin g t he de m111 t &r-i za t ton of the 
a.ta te. After f i f te en week s of ne gotiatio n and mediation 
end ing i n f a i l 'ure ., Gra ha m sub mitt e ' h is 1"ep ort t o t h e 
~ecu~it y Oo noil. 
Constituent Asse mbl y Agai n Annoys 
t he ·tate Depart ment 
In late tw.y 19.51 t he United States dele ation to 
th e United Nations was quite dis tu rbed over the convening 
of the constit u en t asse mbly in India .n-held Kas bmir . Gross 
said his govern ment believed that no lastin g settlement 
to the dis pute could be ac-complis hed if the two parties 
did not abide by the methods of solution a gree-able to both. 
If the action proclai med by Pri me 1tlnister Abdullah of 
Indian-held Kas hmir were carried out, an d India sa n ctio ned 
this action, Gross maintai ned, no possible sol u tion could 
be envisioned. Washi ng ton announc ed t hat it would re gard 
any acts of t h e constitu ent a s sembly to settle the accession 
matter as completely null a nd void, re gardless of what 
assura nces the India n government had already g iven to t he 
1 Council. 
The Second Graha m Mission 
The Security Council waa f orced once a gain to place 
the Kas hmir dispute on its a.genda for discussion~ The 
1
·u • • c or· R • 11 • I ,:;, • • I .I. • · e C • 1 
29 May 1951, Mo. 548, p. 15 •. 6th Yr., 548th Meetin g, 
American d le g ation saw the urg€ricy ct th iseu an d in• ~ 
trod uoed a?:oth er r,~solution jointly wit .. _ the United King • 
dom.. It reaffi1• •,ed the objeoti,.tf.'>S of I1dia nd Pakistan 
to s ttl o thE'I dis pu te peacefully w"i. th a desire to determin e 
t he will of a ll the people o.,. the Ja m:mu an d Kashmir state 
throu gh a free. and impartial plebisc i te cond u cted under th e 
supe .rvision of a UN team,. Dr . G,rahtu n wias a3ked to 
continue- his effo1 .. ta and to see k a plan of demili ts.r1zation 
for th e pa rt ies. Final l y, the Council r eq ue~t ed Graham 
to r eport 1a f i ndings no later than s :Lx weeks aftt?.r th0 
resoluti on went :t.n to ~ffe ct . The State Department t ,lleved 
that the demil:i.ta:r•tzation propoo aits wo ld b..avA to for m t he 
so li d basis for an fut11N~ a 0 re,ements •
1 
Graham ts second report was g i ve-11 to th Se curity 
Council at th<il Palaia De Chs.i ll Gt ., Paris; on De cember 18 , 
1951. Nego tla t iorrn had b-e en ea.rried on with Zafrulla 
Khan of Pakistan and ehe.gal Rau cf Ind1Ei, but without 
s u cc , s • One month later, on Ja nu ary 12., 1952 ; the , Ar11erican 
del egate not.ea that Gra ham did not at tempt to . impos e any 
se t tle-me .. t upon the tw parties. The :mediat or, he continue d, 
merely -sugg es ted that Ind:la and Pakistan a gr ee to <Hn·~tain 
issues before ' a- set~lement co u d be aP~mp lis he d j These 
a gr ~ed issues were: 
(1) The scope of de mi li t a ri zation a nd t he 
numb er o f troops to remain a. t the e nd o-r 
1u • . .'-:., 8 •• , 
Nove mber 1951, p. 1 .. 
the period of demilitarization. 
(2) A de.ftinite period of demilitarization 
(.3) An establis hod dsy :for the intr duction 1 into office of the Plebiscite Administrator. 
The State Depart ment believed th.at these three issues 
formed a solid basis upon which India and Pakistan could 
arrive at an a greement. The American deputy represent.ative 
expressed confidence that these issues could be solved and 
negotiati ons .should not be halted; in fact, Graham should 
r-eturn to the sub ... oo:atinent, basing further medi ator y 
' ? 
efforts on the resolutions of the Council . ... 
Fur ·the:r Mediation Efforts 
Upon the adoption of an American resolution, Graham 
was .in,.atrue .ted for the third time to aid the parties in 
settlement and repo;r,t back to the vouncil at the end of 
Mareh 1952. This we..s to be a "final attempt.ft to get the 
disputants to a gree on a plan 'ior demilitarization. When 
Graham gave his third report to the Se c r1ty Council he 
again reported failure. Th~re was ene si gnificant point 
in his findings a.nd this was that he eonsidered it an opportu ne 
time to consult the Plebiaeite Administrator, Chester w. 
Nimitz on preliminary plans for implementing a plebisci .te. 
Unfortunately, India and :Pakistan objected to this su ggestion 
1u. N., S. C., Oft' . Rec., 7th Yrq 570th Meeting, 12 
,Ja nua 'Ji"y 1952, f'o . 570, p . 10. 
2 :ibid., 7th Yr., 57ls.t j eeti ng , 30 .ianuary 1952, 10 . 
571, p. n:-
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.for callin g in the administrator as premature . 1 
The Council was not discoura ged over Graha m's failure 
on t he sub-continent . For the fourth time Graha m was sent 
by the Counci l to ne got i ate with the _pa;rties, fir -st in New 
York Qlld then in Genev.a , Swi.tze:rlandr RetU;rning to l'fow 
York wit h his fourth repor t , he submittea his r1ndings to 
the Security Council on SeptembeJ? 11, 1952. Summarizing 
the problems confr0ntin g the disputants, he then made re -
commendat ions, and noted t he difficulties of his position as 
mediator . The foupth Graham mission had ended in failure . 2 
Discussion in the General Asse mbly 
$peaking before the General Assembly at its 380th 
meetin g , Secretary of State Acheson menti oned very briefly 
the major issues confrontin g the United Nationi . Although 
not spe cifica l ly naming th e India ... Pakistan dispute, he did 
say the General Assembly could "create an atmosphere favor• 
able to settle:ments 0 in aecord with the princi pl s of t he 
Charter.. He also declared that these settlements should be 
worked out by the parti es the mselves . 3 Perhaps Acheson as 
able to see that the Council could not · perfo rm its appointed 
tas k of establ1$hing conditions auitable f'or the gr owth of a 
l U. N. , $ . C. , Off' . Rec . , 7th Yr . , Speci al Supplement 
No . " , p . 1. 
2 Ibid . , 7th Yr . , 60$.th Meeting , 10 October 19 52, No. 
605, p . ~ ~ 
3u. N., G. A., Off . Reo . , 7th Session , 380t h Plenary 
~eetin g , 16 Octob er 1952, p . 42. 
peaceful conclusion of disputes. He saw in th Asse mbly 
a powerful force of world opinion that; would compel 
the parties involved in a dispute to settle it amicably, 
and as r•apidly as possible. The Kas hmir deadlock had be en 
before the Coui'lcil for- a pez-.iod of fou1"' years and 1 t was 
well i~to its fifth year ith no solution found by the 
appointed arm of the United Nations . 
India was apparently willin g to let the iatter rest 
for the time being, for her de le gates to the G·en e ral Asse mbly 
failed to make any reference to the issue in Novembe r 1952. 
The iasue,however-, was not for gotten by the Pakistani 
dele gate, for on November 12 Zafrul la Khan announced that 
the Council's inability to solve the dispute had not en -
hanced or stren gthened the authority and prestige of the 
United Nations . He placed the responsibility for solving 
the deadlock upon the Security Council and specifi c.a ll y 
upon the five reat powers; yet he saw his own government's 
actions as beyond repr oac h . Thi s may ha ve be en the earliest 
evidence o:f Pakistan's "f'r st.ration" in t he dispute . 1 
A Fifth Anglo -American ie s olutio n 
Sends Gra ham to the Sub-continent 
As a r-eeu l t of the pressuring an rineedlingu of the 
Pakistani del egation, ·the Security -Council in l&te 1952 
voted still another resolution prepared by t he United St ates 
1u. N., G. A.., Off . Rec., 7th Sessi on , 395th Pl enary 
Meetin g, 12 Nove mber 1952, p. 237. 
and the United Kin g dom. e>;peakin g fo1 .. the f'o:r:mer, Ernes t 
"ro~ s indic"'ted that Sf;ttleme t nmu t be ba sod upon these 
principles; 1 
(1) Agr.emsn, by both pa~ ies to the fol1ticel 
questions involved . 
(2) An agreement r ached by both parties them -
selves~ 
(~) Negotiations based on compromis e. 
(4) The future of the state to b e determin ed 
b~ the fre and impartial plebiscite under 
Unitod Nations auspices • 
. 
Tb1s resol u tion endortied the recommend tions .a:mde by 
Graham in his .fourth report. The problem h ad bee n nar rowed 
d wn to one basic issue~ the American-sponsor d pl an 
would help overco me this i ssue. India an d~ klstan ohoul d 
ne gotia ~ w:t th the aim of ra chin 6 g1"'eement on the sp ec ific 
nuniber of forces wituln c ertain &res or ranges sugges ted 
l y Gra ham. This was the one problem upon which the two 
diaputent~ had failed to agree. r.rho dra f t resolution en-
doxised G aham'a previous sug gestion that "t h is number s hould 
be between 3;000 and 6;000 armed forces re.maining , on th e 
Pakistan Bide of the cease-fire line, and bEttwean 12.,000 
0.1d 18;000 armed forces remaining on the Indian side of the 
l ine. n · After th e demilit a rize ti on period had ended, s.11 
Pakistani nationals; troops, and tribesmen would be with ... 
drawn f r om tb e Pakistan side of the 11n, On the I n i an side 
all thei. tr oops• oul e withdraw .. ,. A small t o {en fo rce 
would r ma.in i n each a rea t o mai n.ts.in law and · t>der . but the 
} .. . ;.',:, S . C_., Off •. R-c . ,. 7th Yr., 607th .... ctL1g , 5 
December 1952, Jiio . 607 , p •. 2 , 
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force or local police would give due re gard to the freedom 
of t he future plebiscite . 1 Graham was asked to attempt a 
fifth try at me-dia tion and the governments of India and 
Pakistan were asked to collaborate and assist him as much 
as possible . Washin gton viewed the situation as being very 
serious, sayin g t hat if no further action were to be taken , 
and the condition continue d to drift, t h ere would be great 
2 dan ger to all • . 
The Pakistani dele gate , Sir ijohammed Zafrulla Khan, 
was willing to accept t he Ameri can proposal , provided that 
In di a agreed to keep only troops on its side of the eease -
fire line and no a:rrmour or artillery . The Pakistani ar my 
would move out of its occupied area on this basis . 3 
The Indian position had al :ways been tha t all Pakistani 
armies, auxiliary units , and other forees should withdraw 
from every ineh of Jammu-Kashmir territory , and the Azad 
fores in gestern Kashmir (under Pakistani control) should 
b e disarmed . India alone would determine hat forces it 
would withdra .lV. Jawaharla .l i ehr u had ~aid in July 1952: 
It was always a condition that we must 
have enou gh forces in Kashmir, and we were 
1u. N., s. ·c., Off . Ree ., 7th Yr ., 607th Meetin g , 5 
December 1952 , No . 607, pp • .5-9. 
2u .. s., Dep art men t oi' State Bulletin, nu. s . iews 
on Prospects 1:or Settlin g Kashmir Controversy,n XJCVII 
( Dece mber, 1952), 10 30 . 
3u. s. ti P,epart ment of State ~ulletin, "The U. s . 
in the u. N. ,' Yi.XVII (Dece mber, ·1952} . 1042 . 
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the jud ges of that. 1 
On December 8 , Mrs. Vijaya Lak shmi Pandit :reported 
to t he Secu rit y Gouneil that her gover mnent would permit 
a small 4zad f'ol"ee on t h e Pak istani side of the cease-fire 
line, but that state adm1nistrative .aut hor it ies must be 
local peo ple an d not Pakista ni natio nals. Military forees 
on t ne I ndia n si de, sh e conti nu ed, ha d to b fixed in 
number by · I ndian militar y a ut horities . a nd not on th e 
recom mendatio ns of t he UN" military adviser . ada .me Pandit 
reiterated that any a l ternative figures mu.st be justified 
on realistie con sid er~tiona of .aecuri ty, and not be put 
forward merel y as a n1atter er po li t ical bargai ni ng or 
ap pease ment .. In her elos_ ng state ments she said t h.at India 
fou nd it necessar y to r ej ec t t h e Am rictu1 p ro posals i n t h e 
draft resol uticn. 2 
&evert h&less, the .Anglo- American resolution w.aa 
dopted by t he ouneil an d Graham was se nt for the firth 
ti me to t h e s ub -co ntinen t . Upon h is retur,p to Metf York in 
Mar ah 1953 he tran s.mi tted hi$ report, i n fo rmin g t h e Council 
that he had been unable to se tt le t he major differe n ees 
needea before a set t le 10ent oould be ac complis hed . 
'llndia, I nfor·m atio n Service, Kasrunir, lf47•l<z,26, 
Exeer ts fro m Prime ldn lster Neh :r:u1 s S e eches ~New Delhi: 
United Presa, Old Secre tari& t , 19 , p . 31 . 
2u. N. , 2 • C. , Off . ~ o. , 
8 Dece mber 19 52, No . 605, p . 9. 
7th Yr . , 60 8th h.eeti ng , 
' 
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American Policy d~ring the Perio d 1950•1952 
·' 
Was r.J.ng to n , enco ura ged by Indian and Pa.ki sta. n i 
advanc e s, sponsored jointly wit h ot her Council members a 
resolutio n terminatin g t he UNCI:P an d establishin g a sin gle 
United N"atio n-s repre sentativ e. The State Dep~rtment wanted 
the ~eprese ntative, Si r Owen Dixo n, to prepare a prog~am of 
de militarizatio n of the state . His efforts ended in 
failure. Five suecessive resolutio ns spo nsored by the 
United States a nd t.he United Kin gd om se nt Dr. Frank P. 
Gre:ha:m to the sub -c ontinent as t he second United Nations 
representative. All . five at:;empt ·s we re un s ucce ssfu l .. 
The Sta te Depart ment expre~se .d great apprehe n sion 
over the conv ening of the constit uent asse mbl y in Indian-
h ld Kashmir. It de ni ed th e clai ms o f this body to deter mi ne 
Kashmir's future without holding a state-wide ple biscite 
under Un.ited Na ti ons auspices. American dele gates declared 
t hat if the assembly eonoluded t heir plans to app rove t h e 
Maharaja 1 s acceasion, the n nc possible settleme nt could 
be enyisioned in t he dis pu te. New D-elhi replied to t he se 
American fears by indic ati ng· that the as sembl y i.n no 
way pr,ejudioed the i a .2ue; mea nwhile, it en oourage d the 
as semb l y to convene in Sri:ni gar, capi tol of t he state .. 
lri t1ng on Amer•i can po l icy a nd i ta d ev el op :1.nant during 
t hi s p ·eriod, Harry N. Howard ., UN ad viser, n oted t h .at t h e 
United States had s.oug h t a co n str u_eti ve a nd eq uita b le 
solution to t he Kasb mil"' p roble m th r ough the Uni t ed 1tatio ns, 
its or gan~, and by direct ne gotiation wit h each par ty. The 
heart of Ameri can poli 
principle: 
as seen by Howard involved thi s 
If and when set tl ement ca me, the United 
-States would want it · a s result of free 
ag ree m&nt by India and Pakistan with the 
ai of the Council and the uN represen tative. 1 
1Bar ry N. Howard, "The Development of U. s . Policy 
i n t b e Nea r ast, Sou.t h Asia, and .Africa, 19.51-1952," 
Depar•tment of State Bulletin, XXVII ( Novembe r, 1952 ), 898 . 
MILI TARY ID f-0 PAKl srrA 
' 
The "Northern Tie-ru Defense Sys t em 
The major spokesman for t· .e Indian governm ent , 
Prims Ministe r J awaha r lal Uebr u, proclai med in August 1952 
t h a. t the Ka sh.mi ri a wou l d dec id e, t h eir future , a nd · 1 f they 
did not wish t-0 stay with India, then India would not keep 
them again st their wi l l . H.ia attitude would change when 
it became known that Pakistan had planned to accept 
mi litary aid from the Unit d Btates . 1 
(,'he ater- Bowl es, American Ambas sa dor to I ndi a, in 
the same ye ar saw a drastic ch.~nge in U., S. pol i cy occur 
after t hen tional elections in the United States. Thi s 
chan ~e, be noticed, waa i::s.pecially ev id ent after th e 
ill • timed bid had been ext~n ded to Pakistan to join the 
Mid dle East Def ense Or anizati on . T is was greatly inis -
, 2 
understood in India~ 
The State Department an· ~ts mi litary st ra t egi sts 
1Ind1a, Information SQrvice, F...ashmi!' 191 -1 · !56, 
xoerpts. from Pri me Minist er Nehru 's S:gee ch es 
Uni.t ed Press, Ola Se cretariat, 19.56}, p . 32. 
2 0he st er Bowles, Ambassador's Rep ort {New Yor k : 
Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. )4-g. 
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envi$1oned the develop ment of a "northern t ier" def ense 
s ystem, which would include military aid to Pakistan. 
It would be based on a close political ali gnment Wi th Turkey 
and Pakistan. Thit! was without doubt the most outstandin g 
develop ment in the ·area. in early 1954. -The lon g ter m cost 
for the mi litary pro ram would run from 250 to 500 million 
dollars. Th ia pro gra m was ai med at repelling the possibility 
of any Soviet agg ression in that area of the world. The 
· United o:)tates wis h ed to establish a chain of local defensive 
arran gements ope:reted by t he nationals or tho se countries 
who wanted this aid. It did not desire bomber bases, as 
some govern ment s thou ght . 
Stipulations under 
Military Aid Pro gram 
. Thus, in 1954 the Kashmir si tuat1on chan ged abruptly 
when the United Stat es offered military aid under the Mutual 
Defense Assistance Act to those nations needing and asking 
for such aid. Legislation under this grant for mili ta y aid 
stated that: 
~ations reeeiving aid agree that equipment, 
materials, or services provided will be us ed 
solely to maintain its inte .rnal security, f or 
legitimate self-defense, or to permi .t it to 
partic1pat~ in the defense of the area, or 
in United .. iations collective se curl ty arran ge-
ments and measures. It further a grees not !o 
act in a gg ression a gainst any o ther nation. 
lu·. n s ., Department of State Bulletin, The Proble m of 
Security," XXX (March, 1955), 447. 
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The soverei gn state o'f Pakistan requested such aid 
f'rom the Uni teQ States under this act. On February 25, 
1954, · President Eisenhower complied with the Pakistani 
request, but · he assured the world that if this aid was mis -
used or direc·l;ed against another in ag gression, he woul -d 
imrnediately undertake appropriate action within and with -
out the United Nations to thwart ag gression. The Pres ident 
inform ed the · Indian gov ernment that such mill tary aid in 
no way chan ged our relations with India, and if it desired 
military id , the United St ate s would give India the most 
sympathetic cons1deration . 1 
Agreements si gned between Pakis tan and the United 
Stat es were completed in May, 1954, when both governments 
signed a mutual defense a greement at Karachi . The United 
Stat . s would provide military equipment and training 
assistance to Pakistani armed forces as well as a mi litary 
adviso:ry group . 2 Article 5 of the • Pakistan .,. American 
agreement provided t hat: 
l . The government of Pakistan will: 
(a) join in promotin g international under -
standin g and ood will, and maintainin g 
world peace; 
(b) take such action as may be mutually 
a reed upon to el iminate ca use s of 
inter>na tiona.l tension; 
(c) make, consistent with its political a nd 
1u. s ., De;Eartment of State Bulletin~ uThe Problem o-r 
Securi ty , 11 XXX ( March, 1955), 448. 
2u. S . , Dep~ rtment of State Bul letin; "The U • . S . ... 
Pakistan Mutual Defense Assis t ance Agreement,n XXX ( June, 
1954), 850. 
2. (a) 
(b) 
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economic stability, the full contribution 
permitted by its manpower, resources, 
facilities and general economic condition 
to the development and maintenance of its 
own defe n sive strength and t h e def ensive 
strength of the free world; 
take all reasonable measures wh ich may be 
needed to develop its defence capacities; and 
take appropriate steps to insu:re the effectl ve 
utilization of the economic and mi litary 
assistance provided by the United States. 
The Govern.~ent of Pakistan will, consistent 
wit h the Charter of the United Nations, 
furnish to the Government of the United 
States, or to such othex- Governments as the 
Parties hereto may in each case a gree upon, 
su.ah equipment, :material~, servi oes or ot her 
assistance as may be a greed upon in order to 
increase their capacity- for individual and 
collective - self~defenee and to facilitate 
their effective participation in the United 
Nations system for collec tive security. 
In conformity with the principle of mµtual 
aid, the Government of Pakis~an will .facilitate 
the production and transfer to the Government 
of the United States, fbr such period of ti , 
in su ch qua ntities and upon such terms and 
conditions as. may be agreed upon, of raw and 
semi-processed materials required by the 
United States as a result of deficiencies or 
potential deficiencies in its own resources, 
and wh ich may be available in Pakistan . 
Arra ng ements for such transfers shall g ive 
due regard to reasona ble requirements of 
Pakistan for domestic use and comme~cial ex-
port.l 
Accordin g to press releases from the State Department. 
the agreement si gned by the United States and Pakistan did 
not "involve any obli gations on the part of Pakistan to 
provide mill tary bases for the use of the United States. "2 
1
.Mushtaq Ahmad, The U1+i ted Nations and Pakistan 
(Karachi: The Times Press, 1955), pp . 147-48. 
2u. s. , Department of State Bulletin, nTh U. s . ·-
Pakistan Mutual Defense Assista nce Ag ree ment," XXX {June, 
1954), 851. 
u. s. - Indian Relations 
When the decision to grant military aid wa;:) announced, 
many writers on Indian affairs in the United States voiced 
violent objections . Some saw it as very detrimental to the 
Asian relations of the United States because it would release 
a pandora•s box of trouble, prevent or delay settlement 
of the Kash mir dispute, or cau se ex .tremist . elements in 
Pakistan to attack India ,. What was needed., nany advocated, 
was economic aid, .which alone co uld brin g improvement in 
In di an - American relattons . 1 
Some held that America n military aid to Pakistan 
would drive needed development fu nds in India's bud get 
into military expenditures in order to counterbalance 
Paldstan's aid from the United States . American policy 
in this area, they said, should be confined to econolnic aid 
2 
only, not military, and without any strin s attach ed . 
India viewed the aid offer to her neighbor wit h 
concern; in fact, she was nat urally quite suspicious of 
t h ese military pacts. r ehru declared t hat he could not 
understand why Pakistan had accepted American aid; he 
' 
info rmed the In dian parlia ment t hat the situatio n was most 
a bnormal, and t he aid was li ke l y to create a gg ression 
111Trut h an d Consequences in orld Affairs," Foreign 
Policy ulletin, X XIII (January 15, 1954), 6. 
211 h o u ld u. s . Give n 11tary Aid to Pakista n ? II 
Foreign Policy Bulletin, X XIII (February 15, 1954), 4. 
rather th.an prevent it. Nehru s&w the United States as 
"i.nterfering't in normal Indis•P&kistan relations arid 
er..nounced ths .t India wo ld h&VEi t-0 recon-sidtn• the whole 
Y~e . -.ir issue fro -m an entirsly different point of vie 
because f'ddl tic al .forces h ad ee n thrust into Pa.kistftn . 1 
Indi~ became even :mor:e au sp icious of th .e Unit d 
States when rumors r: n wild on the. sub-continent. that the 
.American 3eeretary of State favor---d the idea of partition 
of Kashmir along the present ceese•fire line. '11he situation 
becam e so precarious that in the latte:r part of 195.3 the 
A!n-eriean Amba~sa dor to India, Geor g e V. Allen, prohibited 
'U. s . citizens frc m travelin g into Ks.ah.'1'1ir because of this 
a nti --America n feelin g . 2 
.Ambassador G-. t . eht a, Indian .Amb asador to the 
United States , 'briefly swnmed up Indian forei gn. pol:tc.y 
at this time; declarin g th.a.t his g ov r1 ent wanted no 
entan g lin g allian .ces. India, he noted , wanted time to grow 
and to develop i ta own country. 1'"ehta saw· this period 
as analo gous to that of the United States from 1798 to 
1937.3 
Neverthel·,.ss, India w.ould still fear Pakistan 'a 
1Ind1a, Information S-ervice, Kash mir 1q 
Ex cer ts fl'o:m Pr .ime Minister 1,ebru • s-Speec he~ 
Unite -d .Press, Old Secr$tl:1rlat, 1 _,/ , , p. 38, 
2Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton, N w 
Jersey: Princeton University Press , 1954) ~ p . 238. 
3G. L. Mehta, 11In d1a in World Affairs, 11 Vital 
Spee ches, XXI (July 1~ 1955}, 1322. 
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territorial mbitions on the aub .-continent. $peakin g on 
> 
Indian p reparedne ss in event · of a Paki$tani attack, Ne hru 
proclaimed that : 
Nothing is mer e important in the opinio n 
of this government than to . make India 
economically and militar il y st r(i)ng • not 
in. th Big ower sense, bec!;tus e it is -beyond 
our capacity - but a s st ron g as we can, ·to 
defend ou rse l ve s if anybody attae ks u s. 1 
Econo mi c Aid to India 
Many peop le who sa w the trai ned Indo - Ameri can 
relations durin g the period stro ngl y advo cated an increa se 
in econo mic aid to India , believing that to alie nate India 
with its C'l'reat influence in th at area wo.ul d mean alie nation 
of other fri .nds in Asia . 2 
Economi c aid in t he form of gr ants and loans was 
giv en to I ndi a, t h ou h not as much as India sought . The 
sum of ~1 ,028.,000,000 bad be en provided i n the U. s. 
federal budget f'or economic and techni cal devel opment for 
India, Pakistan, ~~d the Philippines . By Jul y 1955, India 
had si ned six operation al a greements with th e United 
States gove :rmn nt involving loa ns of' 72.5 mi llion. Some 
1shan ti lal Kothari, Inqia's Emer gi ng Forei p;n Pol icie s 
( oinbay : Vora and Compan y , 1951}, p . 69. Kot har i has re -
produ ced this stat ment from Je .waharla l e hru 's, Independen ce 
and Afte r , pp • .317-26. 
2 0hester Bow-l ea, 11Part n ers hip Which 1 ust Not Fai l," 
Vit al .;,peeches, XVII ( :Pilarch l, 1952 }, 304. 
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twelve million of this waa to go into tec hn ical assista nce, 
and about sixt y million into development assistance. 
Althou gh India wou ld not accept mili t ary a id , it would take 
ot h er assista nce in the form of , loa n and direct gra nt s of 
1 
needed materials . · 1h e mere ac ceptan ce of t hi s ai d was to 
be used a ,_ainst India by so me writers and newspapers, for 
t hey saw this aid as bein poured , not into India, but into 
Kashmir by the In dia n gover nment in an effort to inf'l uence 
t he Kas hmiris to re ma in with I ndia. New Delhi ha s atte mpted 
some develop ment of Kas hmir by building dams, water facilities, 
hyd ro-elec t ric statio ns, and se hools. 2 
Regional Pacts 
In 1954 Australia, France, Hew Zealand, Pakista n, 
Thaila nd, t h e United Ki ngdom, t he Philippines, and th e 
United States si gned the Sou t h - East Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty known as SEATO. It was not as stro ng as t he North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. 3 
The SEATO pact provided for the settle ment of 
disputes by peaceful means, t he development of t he abilit y 
to resist attack, and the promotion of econo mic pro g~ess . 
1rndia, Ministr y of External Aff airs, ~or~i gn Affairs 
Record, I (July, 1955), 153. 
2 New York Times, April 25, 1957, P• 7. 
3c. Ea gleton, Int er natio nal Governme nt (New York : 
Ronald Press Co., 1957), p~ S69. 
The preamble reaae: 
Reaffirmin g that i:n acco1,dance with the 
Charter of t h e tJni t&d ation.; they uphold 
the principle of equal ri ghts and aelf-
aeterm1nation o!' peoples, and declarin g that 
they will ear nestly strive by every peaceful 
me,ans to pro mote self government and to 
secure independence of all eountries whose 
peoples desire and are a ble to undertake its 
responsibilities . 1 
Pakistan would uti li z-e the above tc press i tn demands for 
an independent Kashmir,- or a Kash mir t hat could decide 
itself to whom it would finally accede . 
Article 4 of the treaty · noted that: 
{l) Eaoh pa:r•t;y :r• , cognizes that aggression 
by means of armed attac k in the Treaty Area 
ag ainst any of the parttes or a gainst any state 
er territory, whioh the parties by unanimous 
a greement may hereafter desi gnate, would en~ 
dan ger its own peace and safety a nd a grees that 
it will in that avent act to meet the connuon 
dan ger in accordance with its constitutional 
processes. Measures taken under this para gr•aph 
s hall be immediately reported to t he Security 
Council of the Uni t,..d llations . 
(2) If, in t he opinion of any of t he parties 
the inviolability of inte grity of the territory 
or soverei gnty or political independence of any 
part in the Treaty Area or of any other state 
or territory• to whic h ·the provisions of para• 
graph one of this article .fr-om time to time 
apply, is threatened i n ~ny way other than by 
any fa ct or situation which mi ght endan ger the 
peace of the area., the parties shall consult 
immedistely in orde r to a gree on the measures 
which should be taken for co:mmon defence . 
{J) It is understood that no action on the 
territ -ory of any state desi gnated by unanimous 
1Mushtaq Ahmad, The United . at ions arid Pakistan 
( Karachi: The Ti mes Press, 1955), p. 150. 
agree ~ent under para raph one of this ar ticle 
or on any territory so desi gnated shall be 
taken except at the invitation or wifb. the 
consent of the .govern. ""Dent co ncerned. 
Secreta~y of State John Fost r Dulles, in an address 
t ,::) the General .As~ernbly, ma.de no sp ecific :mention of the 
Kashmir dis pu te or t he :.'ATO pact, but did note that disp ut es 
should be referred to the Security Council only after peace-
ful measures had been exha u.sted. 2 Dulles lndir~ctly 
defended t he pact by implyin g that Pakista n was und er 
gNiater ob11 gation to use peaceful meth ods in solvin g the 
Kashmir deadlock . Pakistan could not , without violatin g the 
agre ement an d t he UN Charter, enter into armed a gression 
wit h India over Kashmir. Karachi, as a si gnatory to t ne 
pact, ag reed t hat: 
The parties undertake, as est forth 11'1 the 
Charter of' the Unite Nations,. to settle any 
international disputes in which they may be 
involved by peaceful mel\ns in auch a manner 
that intermrtional peace, security, and 
justice are not endangered, and to refrain in 
t heir international relations fro m the threat 
or use of force in any manner incon2iste~t 
with the. purposes of the Unit e d Nations.J 
Pakistan, althou gh thwarted in its Kasl'unir objeoti ve, 
1Mushte. Al".u~ad, The United Nations and Paki ·sta.n 
(Karachi: The Times Presa, 19 55), p. l~l. 
2u. N., G. A., Off. Rec., 9 th Session, 475th Plenary-
Meetin g , 23 September 1954, P• 26. 
3Mushtaq Ahlll ad, The Uni t d ~ations and Pakistan 
(Karachi: The Times Press, 1955), p. 150. 
e.mpba.tice.lly defended the pact into wp.ioh it had enter-ed. 
Prime Minister Subraw-ardy in 1956 proclaimed that his 
co ntry would: 
loyally adhere to the Sli!A'l.1 0 a greeme .nts and 
the r e is no i:rue~tion of our backin g 01..1t of 
any of our comm1ttmen.ts or agree ment s~ We 
will lo ya lly stand by our e.llies. 1 
S~ATO as Viewed by India 
The si gning of the SEATO pact precipitated great 
fear and apprehenai on in India. Nehr1.1, in speakin g .before 
the Indian parliament, expressed _great concern that these 
SEATO powers would meddle in affairs that were none of their 
business. The internal affairs of India, and t his included 
.Kashmir, whi ch was of vital domes ti c concern to he:r, could 
never be interrupted by a "ri ght to intervene" by any of 
the SEATO members, he said. The Pri me Minister -saw a need 
for India to do "s ·omething" to thwart these pa .eta in Asia. 
His country could 111 afford, he declared, to wait until 
it was absorbed by "evil forces" or ot her develop ment s which 
') India did not like.c. The writer interp;rets Neh:ru1 s outlook 
on SEATO aa a pe.et that pointed Q forced Indla tnto an ar ms 
build-up a gainst a possible Pakista.n:J. threat of invasion. 
SEAT'O :made nc great eontribution. toward stability 
in that area, aceord1ng to Kris hna Menon, Indian delegate 
1Pa k 1et~~Affairs, Oatober 8, 1956, p .. 1. 
2r ndi a, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1ita.ry Alliances, 
Exce ,ts fro m Prime Ministe r Nehru's S eeches in Parliament, 
19 -195, New Delhi: April, 19 7, p •• 
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to the United Nati ons. He e.xpeoted that stability would be 
achieved throu · nei ghborliness, non-interference, and by 
e. world cooperat ing t hroug h the instr umentalities .of the 
United Mations. :en on i mpl ie d that the SEATO pact was 
intervention by a forei gn power in Asian affaira . 1 • 
Wben the SEATO Counoil discussed the Kash.mir issue 
in 1956, India was astounded, and saw Pakistan as using 
this or ganlz$tion to further 1 ts own demands on Kashrnir .. 
Nehru, in a speeoh to the Parliam .ent, declared t hat t his : 
••• confirmed our wors t apprehensions about 
the organization whic h it represents and its 
reference to Kaahmir only means that a 
military alliance is be.ekin g one country, 
mun ly Pakistan, . in its dispute with Indla. 2 
Pakistan had joined these pacts, accor-din g to l'iehru, 
because of her ho stility to India. Yet he ab.solved the 
United Stat~s of any blame in this, by sayin g that the USA 
meant no wron g toward India; in. . fact, it probably did not 
eve n think of India in this conneotion. The Prime Minister 
viewed these pacts as forces pushin g the world in the wrong 
direction. 
To India, the SEAmo pact and milit ar y aid to Pakistan 
had destro ed the very roots of the plebiscite proposals in 
1u. N., G. A. , Off . 1'1eg., 10t h- Session, 533rd Plenary 
Meeting, 4 October 195$, p. 2~2. 
2 India, Lok Sabha , Secretariat , dli t.a y Alliances, 
Excer ta from Prime Minister Nehru's 3 e.eches in Parliam ent , 
9;:,.t.-19::,o, New .velhir Apri l, l;J 7, p . 10. 
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Kashmir. l ehru deolared tha t he could not "talk with 
Pakistan on terms and facts t hat existed ei gh t or n·ne 
years ago. nl 
Karachi Views Kas hmi r Deadlock 
With I mpatience 
Pakistan clai med that India was receivi ng more 
eco nomic aid from the United States th.an Pakistan was 
obtainin g under militar y a gree ments . This, declared Karac h i, 
enabled India to use its own econo mic resources to a much 
greater extent and to turn them into military equipment 
a nd potential. A comparison of military stren gth between 
India and Pakista n , it was pointed ou t, had no relevance 
to t h e issue of ho ldin g a ple b iscite i n Kas hmi r . If the 
dispute cont in ued, it would be difficult fo r t h e gover nment 
of Pakistan to !"estrain t h e Ke.sbmiri refu gees in its 
co un tr y . The dis put e once a gai n had t h e in gredie n ts of a. 
grave threat to the peace of t h e world. 2 
Pakista n maintai ned with spir it t hat American aid 
had not chan ged t he issue at heart. Some writers a gr eed 
with :Karachi on thi s. 3 The Pakista ni Forei gn Office saw 
· 
1India, Infor mation Service, Kas hmi r, 12~7-1956, · 
Exeer ts from Pri me Mini ster Nehru 's S eec hea, New Delhi: 
United Press, Old Secretariat, 19 .·• 
2Pakistan, Pakistan Publications, Ka.s hmir, Powder-
Keg of Asia, (Karachi: 1956}. 
3Josef Korbel, "New Hop e- for Kashmir, ft Foreign . 
l'oliey Bulletin, XXXIV { March 1, 19 55), ,3. 
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no reason for India ·to cut oJ.'f furt her negotiations on the 
issue; 1n fac.t, Mohamad Ali, Prime Einister• of' Pakistan, 
declared :t,,n· 1955 that Pakistan was prepared to explo!'e and 
exhaust all possibilities for a peaee -ful settlement, but he 
warned that as time went on and the dispute con t inued 
unsolved, frustration and bitterness would s ·eize the .minds 
of the Kashmiris and Pakistani people and they would turn 
to desperate measures. He pled ged Pakistan' s very soul and 
existence to the deliverance of the Kas.hmiris from the 
Indian yoke . 1 
The issue was not placed on t h e Securit y Council ' 
a genda durin g 1956. In the {Jeneral Assembly however, the 
Pakistani dele gate, Begum Ikramulluh, resurrected the 
issue and wanted tl1e United. Nations to settle the dispute 
onee an d for all. She declared t hat the Secu1«ity Council 
) did not wish to offend India by making a final decision on 
the deadloek .. 2 
Pakistan felt justified in taki ng the military aid, 
demonstratin g to the West its desire to thwart any possible 
Soviet a gg :ression; o.r so K.arae r.J. informed the V'ni ted States. 
The writer be-lieves that Pakistan l ooked upon these arms gains 
frem the l1nited States as a powerful. bar gaini ng a gent ln the 
Kashmir issue with India. · 
1Pakistan, Ferozsons, All Parties Conference on Kash-
mir, 1955, (Karachi, 1955), pp. 22-23. 
· 
2u. N., G .• A., Off. Rec., 11th. Session, 611th Plenary. 
Meetin g , 6 Decembe:r- 1956, p. ,S81. 
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Nevertheless, Pakistan's frustratio n over t he un -
solved Kashmir deadlock was slowly r ac hin g a ver y crucial 
point .. The ye s.r 1957 would s ee t he disp u te again before t he 
Security Council of the United Nat ions. 
CRAFTER V 
Apprehensions over the Oonstituent Assembly 
The lengthy period. of silence on the Kashmir issue 
was finally broken in January 1957 when the Security 
Council received a letter from the Pri:me Min:tster o!' 
.Pakistan. Be asked the Couneil to reconsider the Indian-
Pakistan dispute over Kashmir.l He reminded the Council 
that previously he had suggested a 500-man United Nations 
force police the state of Kashmir. Hostilities would result 
if a u. !T. fo ·rce were not sent immediately, he added.2 
Henry Cabot Lodge apparently supported Noon, for on 
January 16, l.957, he ur ged the Council to establish its 
position on the issue as soon as poasible. Lod·ge announced 
that if the constituent ass,mbly i.n Indian-held Kashmir 
proclaimed its intentions of deter mining the futi1re of the 
state without waiting for a U. N. plebiscite, then his 
government would be forced to reprove the activities of 
that body. He urged the Council to assist the diaputants 
immediately with respect to reaching an equitable settlement 
1New Yoz•lc _ Times, January .3, 1957, p. 4. 
2 ~ ' 6 Ibid., Janua .ry l .::i, 1957, p. · • 
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before India could accept the new constitution from the 
e.ssembly. 1 
Unfortunatel1, th Sec ~rity Council did no t act 
swiftly enou gh, notwi thsta ndin g t h e fact that Pakistan had 
the support of the United States at t hi s psrtieular phase 
of the problem . By Januar y 21, 1957, the const:i tuent 
assembly in Kashmir had promulgat d a new constitution for 
t he state . It was accepted by t he Indian parliament on the 
same day . The le gal bonds between Kashmir and India were 
now complete, and the United 1~ations ,as faced wit h a 
fai t acqo mpli. In addr•essin g the Council on January 23, 
Krishna 1enon expressed t he · India n attitude by indicating 
that his country had no int nt!on of permitting a U. N. 
plebisoite in the s tate. .Sinc e Kashmir was no,1 an inte ral 
2 part of the Indian Union, be declared, it cou ld never secede . 
Security Council Resoluti on 
Reaffir ms Its Stand on a Plebiscite 
·1ashi ng to n disa greed with this Indian stand. 
Delegat~ Lod ge req uested the Security Council to inform 
!ndia that such a move on i ta pa1-.t was illegal since the 
latter had cons nted to a plebiscite in two UNGIP re-
solutions. The United States, United Kin ,dom, Australia, 
Colo mbia, and Cuba proceeded t o offer a new draft resolution. 
1u. N., s. o., Off . Bee., 12t h Yr., 761st h1eet.in g , 16 
Ja nuary 1957, No. 761, p . 4-1. 
,:, 
c.::New ork Ti mes, January 24, 1957, p . 6. 
In su bstan ce, it declared that any past, present, or future 
activities of t he constituent aase mbly in lndian-held 
K~shmir which attempted to deeide the fut u1"e affiliation 
of the state would be i nvalid. Inserted in the resolution 
was · · ashington' s insistence upon a plebi.sc i te to be held 
by the United ations. Lodge _furt h er re min ded his listeners 
that India and Pakistan had agreed to this in 1948, 1949,· 
and 1951, and this new Indian policy had not chan ged the 
Oounei1 1 s decision to hold a plebiscite. I n sub sequent 
debate on the draft resolution the Indian dele gate remarked 
that his gove rnment cou ld not accept the reco mmendations 
of the Council. l~evertheless, t h Se curity Council adopted 
t he Ameri ean spo nsored resolution by a vote of 10 to • 
The Soviet delegate abstained . from votin g on this resolution. 1 
New Delhi Answers the Seeurity Council 
On January 26, 19 57, the Indian overrunent i$sued 
official statements declarin g the aecession of Kashmir as 
irrevocable; furthermore, India would ignore any further 
Securit y Council resolutions on the Kashmir dispute. The 
constituent assembly of the .state was to b e replaced by an 
elected legislative assembly . An exce~pt from the new 
:Kashmir c-onsti tution illustrates t he difficulties the 
Security -Council would encounter in attemptin g to sever 
1New York lime s, Ja nuary 25, 1957, p. 1. 
the association: 
The law rul s out any amendment or bill 
to make Kash ir part of an other nation .l 
T e tate Department was persistent ia urgin g a 
peaceful solution of the problem., but concrete suggestions 
were not exhibited until one month later. There was some 
discussion in o~f1eial Indian circles ef the poasibllity of 
a. solution based upon partition, but there were no atte mpts 
by the Com1ei l to inveati ate these :re . 01-.. ts. 2 
The Jarri ng Mission 
By t he middle or February the Council waa ~esd y to 
su ggest another ef f ort to a.rd satisfactory solution. The 
United States, United Kin gdo,m., Auat1•alia., Cuba, and 
Colombia sponsored another joint draft resolution that 
asked for a • t1 "'Uoe a.1,.reement, demilitarization, plebiscite , 
and the utili~ation of au. N._ fortce to police the voting 
proeedures. The resolution was vetoed by tl1e o'V'iet ·v..ion, 
giving as its reason opp osition to the use of au. N. force. 
v"iashlngton withdrew the item on U. r-1. troops and the revised 
draft resolution was adopted by a vote of 10 to O, the 
USSR abstaini ng . It a-ked th e Security Council Presldent, 
Gunnar V.. Jarrin g of Sweden., to explore any and all 
lNew Yol"k Times, January 26, 1957, p. 1. 
2 1bid ., January 31, 1· :57, p. 3. 
poas1bilit1es of solution . 1£ necessary he was to visit · 
th0 sub.-co.ntinent for thi s purpose " ml r-ep01·t back to the 
Council no la i..lH' than ·Apr l 15, 19 57 ~ 1 
'.fhe rJn:t ted Stat es a nd the "Jni ted If1.na:·do m had 
..... 
collaborated quJ. t s- elos e l . 611 t h1 res olutio n ., Its tone 
was much mild&""· t han p revious res olu t io ns . I n as .king , Gunnar 
Jarriu g to medi ate for. the Council, they selected a man who 
h~d thorough knowled e and unde:r•standin g of he Kashmir 
proble m. -Ie nad s<u ... ved a the Sw-edish 1,mbsseado1 - to- l11.dia 
i :i:1 1948 a n d to Pakistan in 1952. Con::.d.de~ed by his ¢0 .. 
workeNJ in the United :. a tions as a ud1ploma tic gentleman." 
he, i:f anyone, could help the two disputants in arriving 
at an immediate solution . 2 Apparent .ly, he knew b-efo1•ehand 
what the ou t co111e of h is et'fort.s would be, for in au interview 
with a ~ ~ 11,'imes I'eporte.r., h e s~dd l1e was n ot hop eful 
of any success ef the m1s~ion. Ri s methods .of tr ·eetin g the 
subjeet were f i1"st to br•in g t he two :pe.rti~s to g ether to try 
and see k agree ments 011 a so11..1.t.ion., and then to atte mpt to 
have it brou ght before the I:nts1•national Court of Justice 
if the first met hod failed .3 
The ! nd:1.e.n govez·nruent was not particultil "ly cor.werned 
over t he exist en ce of th J's.rrin g mission. It had indicated 
1u. Ii.., s . c., Of-J;. lee . , 12th Yr., 774th ~·e-eti .r.1.g, 
21 Februar y 1957, No. 774,. p. 32. 
2 
.. ~w York Times, Peb:r•ua:ry 14, 1957, p. 13,. 
3Ibid., February 16, 1957, p. 10. 
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to the Council that an y further resolutions on Kashmir 
' . 
would be i gnored . In ombay, Nehr-u assailed the B1"i tish-
f • ~ • \ 
American stand on Kashmir . He stated t he only reason why 
Paklstan had t h e support 'cif '&hese two powers was becau se of 
i ·ts me::nbers h 1p in t he Bagdad pact ,. At a later election 
. 
r·&lly at Kampur, h declared emphatically t:t.iat his countr y 
would never• allow any power on earth to c:oeroe he-l' to chan ge 
the Kashmir stand. 1 
El ections in 
lndian- fleld Kashmir 
In Mar ch 1957 elections were held in the Indian 
occupied area of Kashmil .. , Some thirty- ,ei ght ca ndidates 
were elected to t he le gislative assembly, and all were 
membe~s of t he pro-Indian Kashmir ational Confer$nce 
arty. No opposition parties were listed on the ballot . 
The question of a plebiscite was not a camps..i gn issue . 
Autho r ities in the state saw to it that any opposition 
groups favorin g a plebiscite were tec hnically erased from 
the election lists. orty-four leadin g K.ashmiris, all 
advoeatin g a plebiscite, were held s.s political prisoners, 
Au thori t ies cla imed t his group followed an ille gal political 
line w.hi ch endan g ered the state. 2 
1New York Times, arch 5, 1957, p. 3. 
2 Ibid., March 6, 1957, p. 10. 
-
The Jarrin g Report 
Gun nar .Jarring submitted his report to the Security 
Couneil on April 30, 1957. e n~tea t hat both parties wanted 
to settle t he proble m but could find ·no basis for agr eement . 
His missio n was unsucc essful . is reco mmendations included 
arbitration ·of qu estions involvin g t he exact cease-fire 
line and the evacuatien of troops from Kashmir . The 
arbitral body, accordi ng to Jarring ; would lat er indicate 
to the parties what measures should be taken to arrive at 
a solution . Pakistan fell in line with hie su estiona, 
but India did not thi nk arbitration was appro priate to t he 
Kashmir issue. In a press dispatc h to t he~ York Times, 
Jarrin g re garded t he case as closed . 1 
Washi ngton and Karachi 
Continue Th eir Demands for a Plebiscite 
Upon fa i l ur e of t h e Jarrin g mission, Pakistan and 
the United States renewed t heir efforts for a plebiscite 
under U. i. au spices . At a pres s conference in Washin g ton, 
Secretar y of State Dulles declared t hat sinc e t he Jarr-in g 
ne gotiations were unsu ccessf u l the Seour i ty Council decisio n 
to hold a ple biscite was b :lnd;ing on the parties . 2 Not only 
did Pakista n demand a plebiscite but it ask d f or t he 
unq ualified sup port of t h e United States on th e entire 
:Kashmir issue. 
1New-York Tim es, May 1, 1957; p . 12 . 
2u. s . , Departmen 'l; of State .Bulletin, t1state ment by 
uecre t ary 0 f State Dulles, 11 XXXVI ( F'ebruary 25, 19 57), 306 . 
Prime Minister Suhraw ard y was certai n he could count 
on the United St ates to take a pro.Pakistani po ition in 
the Kashmir deadlock , He was confident that with American 
pressure in the Council and th Assembly, other nations 
could be made to see the justice of Pakistan's cause. 1 
Karac hi wanted the O'nit ed tates to repeat the .stand it . had 
taken in March 1957. The Pakistan Foreign Offiee further 
asked that the Unit ,ed States discontinue aid or help to 
those nations, . specifically India, whom .Pakistan viewed 
as potenti al aggressors . Karachi saw India's rapid military 
growth in 1956•1957 as indirectly based upon ~he sizable 
eco nomic aid pourin g in from th e Uni ted States . 2 India had 
been using this same a ument against Pakistan since 1954, 
b.ut i:n relation to military and economic aid •. 
The Resolution of Dea-ember 1957 
The most recent attempt on the part of' the United 
States to secure agr ementa leading to a solution was in 
the Security Council in the latter half of 1957. Washington 
suggested that Dr . Frank P. Gra ham negotiate wtth India 
and Pakistan. The American representative, Ja mes Vi adsworth, 
asked the Council to be patient but persistent in continuing 
its efforts to implement the previous UNCIP resolutions. 
Any f rther agreements toward solution, he maintained, must 
1New York Times, July 15, 1957, p. 3. 
2 P kistan ews Digest, July 15, 1957, p. 3. 
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1 be based on these resolutions. lndla and Pakistan had 
p l'•evious ·ly a reed to Q tr-..ice a raement, cease-fire line, 
demilitarization, and ple biscite durin g the negotiations 
un dertaken by t.h e UNCIP in 1948-1950., and tl ese resolutions., 
ad ded f!ad sworth, woul d be t e g re a test aids e.t so l ution . 
On . .December 2~ 1957; th American reecmu nendationa . were 
embodied in a re so lu t io n sponsor d jo i n tly with the United 
Kingdom . It request.e ·d G~aham to act as med iator in the 
Kashmir de a dlock. The r e solution further reque3ted both 
partie .a to refPain fro 111 is.suing statements that would 
a ggravate the s itu ation. Before repo!"t .i ng baek to ·the 
Council , Graha m was asked to make all po ssi b le su gg estions 
and · recom mendations at solution . 2 The Ame~ican de le gate 
added that if pro gress could be made on demilitariza tio n 
iss ues ; then possibly a g r•e ment s could be made on other 
dif feren cesw 3 
Pakistan Seeks , upport 
Throu gh I ts Membe1 .. ship i n the Ba g dad Pact 
Pakietan pleaded its case not only in the United 
Nations, but in t he Council sessions or the Ba.g da.a pact as 
well .. Pri me Minis te r Khan Noon ma.de a frontal attack on 
1u. N. , s .. . . , Of:(. Rec., 12th Yr . , 797th Meeting, 
25 October 1957., N'o. 797, PP• 19 - 20 . 
2u. s ., Depart.ment of State Bulletin,nTheTJ . s. in 
the U. N • . , u XXXVII ( December 2.3, 19~7), 10lo-10171-
.3u. N., s . C.; Off. Ree., 12th Yr., 808th :.eatin g , 
2 December 1957, No . 808, p . '11 . 
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t he policies of the ;··estern nat ions for their lar ge sc ale 
aid to so -c a ll ed "neutra lis t" countr ie s. Khan suggeste d 
t hat h is cou nt r y be equi pp ed with atomic weapons . The 
Unit ea States and the United Kin gdom were denounced f or 
not supportin g Pakist an on th e Kashmir i s sue . J?or his 
cou ntr y to remain with t he West , he an..~ounc ed, it must have 
substantial econo mi c and mi litar y aid over and above that 
gi ve n to India. 1 
Kar a.chi pap rs were extremely vocal ove r t h e lack 
of American sup port in Pakistan's qemands on Kashmir . The 
editors of Dawn indicated that Noon 's re gi me would soon 
fall if it did not obtain more economic assista nce and 
mi litary ai d from the We st . 2 In a move t hat was har dl y a 
surprise, Khan Noon informed his National, Assembly that if 
the ··estern allies failed h is country on the i'i.aahmir dispute 
or stopped arms aid un der pressur e of India, his na tion 
wou ld break all pa cts an d seek other friends . Re concluded 
his speech by dec lari ng that Pakistan wou ld undertake _ a 
th orou gh revision of its Kashmir policy i f Graham fai led 
in this latest mis s1 on .3 
As of a:reh 27, 19.58, Frank P. Gr aha m had not 
1Pakiatan News Digest, February 15, 1958, p . l. 
2I bid ., p. J. An edito ri al repr oduced from Dawn, 
a daily iiewspaper pub lis hed in Karachi; Pakistan, n:cr:-
3 Ibid • , Mar ch 15, 19 58 , p • 1. 
-66-
submitted h is repor t to the Security Council . The writer 
does not believe t hat he will achieve any su ccess i n ~bis 
mission. 
I n s1unmarizin t h e r ecen t atte mpts by t h e Council 
to solve the deadlock, it should be noted th at special 
~mphasis was placed up on a plebiscite in Kashmir. h e 
United Stat es spec i fically indicated to I nd.ia and 
Pakistan t ha t the y had agreed to a plebiscite in the earlier 
UNGIP resolutions. Th Jar r in g :missio n was to make use of 
these res ·olutions, a:nd i n order to imple ment the m, J arrin g 
urged the two parties to ar b itrate all controversial 
issues involvin g demilitarization of the state _. Pak ista n 
acce pted his r e commendations, India did not . The Jarrin g 
mi ssio n ended i n failure . 
The Gr a ham missio n followed in late 1957 and con--
ti nue d i nt o 1958. There is little rea s on to expe ct t hat 
an y agree ments will result from Graha m's ne gotiatio n with 
Indian a nd Pakistani leaders. 
I n the i nt erest s of bot h I ndia and Pakistan the 
issue s hou ld be settled because militar y expenditures sre 
takin g a great deal of nee ded cnp ital from their eco nomies. 
The Kashmir deadlock has cont ri bu ted notbin 0 toward t h e 
deve l opment an d p ro gress of t he sub -co nt i nen t. If anyt hing , 
it has developed two opposin g mill tary fo r ces, w-ell equipped 
and trained for any emer gency. The Kashmir issue ha cr eated 
mas s ive ar ms supplies and equipment . - ot h count ries sho u ld 
be develo ping t he ir agricultural and industrial r esou rces to 
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t hoir fullest .. Vi th teeming millions to fe e d_. and 11 ttle 
food to distribute, Pakistan and India face tremendous 
problems in the 1ears ah ead . 
c-APTER VI 
CO CLUSION'S 
U., s . Policy toward 
the Accessio n Instr ument 
Throu ghout the entire co urse of the investi gatio11 
the writer has be~ unable to find any positive actio n which 
eould be interpreted as acceptance by Washington of t he 
accession 1natru:me .nt si gned by t h Maharaja. of Kashmir 
and t:q.e Indian government. American dele gates to the United 
Nations made no referen ce to it in t h 1r discuss1ona befor e 
the Security Council or the General Assembly . India's 
entire ar gument was based on the le gality of this ag ree-
ment whieh the United State~ completel y i gnored. 
Peaceful Method s 
as the First Key to Settl ement 
The Unit@d States did net sanction the use of violence 
in settlin g t h e Kashr nir situation. ·Was hington did, ho wever, 
su gg at t he use of a tr. f1 .. force to police t he ho ldin g of' 
a plebi~cite 1f and when it could be held . Pakistan con• 
sented t ·o this, but India stron g ly objected to the placi ng 
of forei gn t r oops on her soil. Conc .iliation , mediation, 
negot-iation,, arbitration, and ju st iciable set t lement before 
the International Court of Justice were still other met hods 
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recommended by t he St ate Department in solvi ng the problem. 
Washington urged both par ·ties to refrain fro m usin g force 
in their ha ste to solve the deadlock. Thus, the first 
maj or key toward .settlement was in continued use of pacific 
means of solution. 
The Second Key to Settlement 
1rias hington pla ced special empha sis upon holdin g a 
fre and impartial plebiscite in Kas hmir . Just as New 
Delhi rested its case on the accession agreement a one, so 
the State Depart ment based its policy on a second key to 
solution - upon a plebisci t e which would determine the 
future of the state. From 1948 to 19$7 every proposal 
sponsor ed or approve d by the United States included this 
essential item. India orirrinallJ proposed the plebiscite 
as a solution and gave at least lip s~rvice to this means 
from 1947-to 1954. The elaim by India that a change of 
circumstances alte red the means of sol u tion was put forth 
in May, 1954, and has been maintained until the present 
(19 58). In justifying its reversal in methods or sol ution, 
Nehru has clai me-d that t he Kashmir issue had to be recon-
sid ere d due to the thrusting of milit ar y aid and forces 
into Pakistan. \'ashingt on and Karachi deny that military 
aid has ehangea the issue of a plebiscite. 
Char ges of Aggressio n 
India has atte mpted si nce 19}-1-8 to have the Securit y 
Council brand Pakistan as an agg ressor . In each instance 
the American delegation failed to take- any stand on thi s 
and abstai ned from voting. The United States and other 
members of the Council wou l d not co ndemn Pakistan as t he 
a ggressor in Kashmir . u. N'. medi ators and commissions were 
of cour s ~, not endowed w~th power s desi gned to esta blish 
respo n si bi lit y or gui lt in the dea dlock. 
American Policies W~l3e Not Neutr alist 
The United States could ill af f ord to take a definite 
side in disp utes between the two power s a nd lose an important 
potential al ly . It chose t o serve as a f ri ndly, i mpartial 
ar biter and ran the risk of losing the go od will of both . 
Patient listen ing and t hour)ltful su gg stio ns of solution 
were two a s ects of t hi s policy . Pakistan viewed this 
America n sta nd on Kashmir as definitely neutr alist . New 
Delhi, however , viewed it as anti - Indi an. Was hingt on 
ordered the American dele gation to t h e Unit ed !-latio ns to 
tak part in all di scussions on t he issue . The evidence 
of a,eti ve Amer ic an par ti ci s.tio n toward solution of the 
pro ble m can be se en in th e nin e resolutions spon so re d by 
the United States alo ne or jointly wit h ot her Council 
members . 
The Effe c t of e road U. s . Policy 
upon t h e KQshmir I ssue 
Ameri can polic y for Southeast Asia containe d two 
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:major ai ms of whic h the first TiTas stability throu gh a.dequate 
defe nse a-nd internal security . Was hin gton believed t hat t his 
oould be 'beat a chieved by direct mi litary aid to nations i n 
t h is area . Pakistan applied for this aid m1d received it . 
India was offered equivalent aid and rejected i t . The ar ms 
build - up -in .Pakistan was a i1 excuse used by India to deny a 
plebiscite in Kashmir and to hold on t o t he lior!s share ~f 
the are in dispute. 
The second aim . of this broad policy was assi .stanee to 
eac h cou ntry in creatin g conditions whieh would permit the 
economic and cul tu ral development o.f t he people.a in the 
area . Eoonomtc assistance was ext end ed to both countries wit h 
more to I ndia after 1956; much to the dis may of Karachi . 
The core of th is doctrine advocated t h e settle ment 
of d i sput s t hrou gh peaceful, equitable means bot h wit hin 
and wit hout tl e United Wa t i ons . Broad polic y called :fo-r 
t he settlement of these pr•oble ms in aecorda n ce with t h e 
moral principles and opinio ns or mankind. 
Prospe cts For The Future 
Washin gton views the di spute as unchan ged fro m its 
inception i n 1948 to the present. New facts such as t h~ 
milita ry aid to Pakistan and other alliances have not 
altered t he is sue, accordin g to state ments made by America n 
dele gat es i n the Sec urity Council . Reports from t he Sta te 
Department indicate t hat a common basis for a gre ement still 
exists between India and Pakistan upon which they and the 
Council oan achieve settle ment .. The Unite d States v·a1ues 
- t h e 1'r1endship of' both countries . - Alt hough Pakistan has 
t h reate ned to use force to settle the issue. the writer 
does not believe that it wou ld utili3e suc h a cou.r s of 
action . 
Hostilities between India and Pakistan to settle 
the deadlock would b sheer fo ll y . Both are economically 
unable to undertake a wartime program . The only area 
upon which th ere i.e similarity in poli cy b the two 
cont es ta. .... 1ts is their unq ua lified ref'usal to accept any 
form of' partitio . • The /tate Department .h s never 
su g~ ested t~Aa as a sol ution . American policy ha s slwa~s 
b en guided by the desire of the Kasb.miri s, .follo win g the 
traditional poli cy of self-determination. ?.'he dilem..ina 
ha bee n that it cannot know these desires unti l a f:ree 
pl eb:lseit e is he ld. The real mind of the p eop le cannot 
be aseert ine if f orei gn troops ar at their doorstep • 
.Remove these troop s, insure the holdin g of a fr ee and 
impart ia l ple bis oite, and t he fact remains that this will 
be a cleat- indication of the people's will. 
If the ple biscite solution cannot be acco mpl is h ed, 
what other course is t her e to take? American de le gates to 
the Security Counoil have stated th a t Ind ia and Pakistan 
do not want settlement! 1 
26 
1u. N. , S .. C. , Off. Rec . , 3rd Yr. , 304th Meet ing ., 
y 1948, pp. 20-21 . 
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Perhaps that is the case, for lead er s in India and 
Pakistan know that if religion is to be the basis of 
nationality and Kashmi r is the test cas, then so me for.ty 
million Musli ms in India and fourteen mi llion Fi.indus in 
Eas-t Pakis an itmnediately be com se mi-al iens -. .. hould war 
break out on the sub•continent the status of minorit ies in 
India and Pakistan would be deplorable; end th possibility 
of such a oon rlict de ends lar ely on the Kashmir deadlock, 
its solution, and t he met hod in which its future is determined. 
In time of erisis the majo rit y community in th e two 
coun tri es would tend to conside r the min ori ty a potentlal 
"fi:fth column." La r ge scale mig r atio ns would res u lt from 
war or even a plebi sci te in favor of Pakistan. ··1grations 
in the past were disastrous fo r both dominions. There is 
no guarante e t ha t po pulation move.men·t;s in th fu t ure will 
be free fro m reli gio u s an d pol iti cal rio ts . 
If the peop le of Kas hmir s hou ld deeide i n f .avor of 
Paki st a n , t he Indian cone pt of a secular stat e v;ould be 
un der mined • .Possibly other Moslem areas in India would 
demand autonomy or association with .Pakistan . ew r:e l hi 
would neve r be able to accept this~ 
Shoul d the Kashmiris decide against Pakist .an ln a 
· plebiscite, and favor an in dependent status, it would call 
into que stio n the validity of t he whole cas e of Pakistan's 
existence; f or her e th writer would se the fi rst serious 
denial of t h e reli g ious state. 
If both chose to r 0 mai n throu gh the years on the 
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cease- fire line, t he writer wou ld have to a dmit th a t t h ere 
is lo gic in. the view tha~ neit he r side really wants a fin.al 
settl ement . The g 1~eateat h eal r is time, a nd slowly ·th e 
status quo comes t o be a ccepted . 
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